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VEIL PIERCING AND THE UNTAPPED POWER OF
STATE COURTS
Catherine A. Hardee*
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court in recent years has embraced an anti-majoritarian trend
toward providing constitutional protections for the elite who own or control corporations. This
trend is especially troubling as it threatens to undermine the balance found in state corporate
law between private ordering for internal corporate matters and government regulation to
police the negative externalities of the corporate form. The Court’s interventions also have the
potential to leave vulnerable groups without the protection of religiously-neutral laws designed
to prevent discrimination, protect workers, or provide essential services such as health care.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet explicitly preempted what has traditionally been the
province of states, the Court has relied, both implicitly and explicitly, on its own controversial
definitions of state law as the foundation on which to create speech rights for corporations and
religious rights for corporate owners. Absent explicit federal preemption, states can and should
fight back against this creeping federalization of state corporate law.
This Article provides a roadmap. It suggests modest changes to the veil piercing doctrine
that can help to restore, at least in part, the balance of power between states and their corporate
creations. A state court signaling to business owners even a potential for piercing, and thus the
potential for unlimited personal liability, could discourage corporations doing business in the
state from seeking religious exemptions to neutrally applicable laws. Most importantly, these
changes do not threaten to undermine the corporate control mechanisms that have allowed for
efficient private ordering within corporations, nor will they allow corporations to avoid these
third-party protections by reincorporating in a different state. Forcing the federal courts to
confront state assertions of their right to limit and define corporations will, at the very least,
require the U.S. Supreme Court to be transparent about the extent to which it intends to
federalize state corporate law, advancing rule of law values like certainty and predictability
that are important to individuals and corporations alike.
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INTRODUCTION
In dodging the substance of the corporate claim in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,1 the United States
Supreme Court has ensured that the issue of corporate rights will remain
a subject of ongoing litigation and scholarly critique. Critics of the
Roberts Court’s expansion of free speech and religious rights to
corporations argue that the Court is using its anti-majoritarian power to
protect the rights of powerful elites at the expense of women, labor, and
1. 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
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the poor.2 In addition, the Court’s corporate rights opinions exert pressure
on state corporate law.3 The Court relied on its own definitions of state
corporate law to create speech and religious rights for corporations,
definitions with which many corporate law scholars disagree as a matter
of state law interpretation.4 The Court has also left to state courts the
burden of determining how corporations can exercise such rights, creating
tension between corporate law’s historical purpose of facilitating private
ordering and its new need to balance the constitutional rights of
shareholders.5 This Article departs from prior commentary to argue that,
counterintuitively, this apparent flaw in the Court’s doctrine provides a
significant opportunity for states to ameliorate the third party harms
caused by corporate exercise of Court-recognized constitutional rights. In
short, state corporate law doctrines like piercing the corporate veil provide
an avenue for states to incrementally reassert their regulatory
prerogatives, while balancing classic private ordering with corporate
constitutional rights.6
The Court’s opinion in Citizens United v. FEC7 sparked a new era of
corporate rights by granting all corporations the right to political speech.8
The Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.9 decision gave shareholders of
certain corporations a statutory right under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) to utilize the corporate form to exercise their
personal religion.10 These expanded corporate rights, along with other
2. See Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015); Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts’ Role in Eroding “We the People’s” Ability to
Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 423, 440 (2016).
3. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639, 657
(2016) (noting that corporate speech and religious rights “push to state corporate law the task of
resolving disputes among corporate participants on issues of social, political, and religious
dimension”).
4. Such critics include Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr. of the Delaware Supreme Court, the most
influential corporate law court in the country, who has been an outspoken critic of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s foray into corporate law. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival
of Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71, 109 (2015); Leo E.
Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course? The Tension Between Conservative
Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 363 (2015).
5. See Vincent S.J. Buccola, States’ Rights Against Corporate Rights, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
595 (2017); Pollman, supra note 3, at 369.
6. See infra Part III.
7. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
8. Id. at 365 (holding that “the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the
speaker’s corporate identity”).
9. 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
10. Id. at 2785 (“The contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, violates
RFRA.”). In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court was expected to determine whether shareholders have
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doctrinal shifts in recent years, have led to concerns that the Roberts Court
is stacking the deck in favor of corporate elites over the general public.11
Citizens United and its progeny have made it difficult to limit moneyed
interests’ ability to influence politics, with election spending skyrocketing
since the controversial decision.12 Scholars are concerned that the Hobby
Lobby decision will leave political bodies unable to protect third parties—
especially historically vulnerable populations—from the increasing
power of corporations in our society.13 Taken together, these trends
suggest the Roberts Court is reviving a legal era where the judiciary
prevented the political bodies from enacting legislation to protect
vulnerable populations from perceived corporate excess.14
For those concerned with the consolidation of corporate power in
society, the first best option is for the U.S. Supreme Court to change
direction and reign in this relatively new corporate rights doctrine.15 Given
the current composition of the Court, however, that may be unlikely. This
Article suggests that if reversing course is doubtful as a practical matter,
focus may be productively directed to ways that state corporate law can
a constitutional right to use their corporation to exercise their personal religion, express artistic
speech, or some combination of the two. See Eric Segall, Symposium: Disentangling Free Speech and
Freedom of Religion in Masterpiece Cakeshop, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 13, 2017, 10:33 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/09/symposium-disentangling-free-speech-freedom-religionmasterpiece-cakeshop/ [https://perma.cc/7HRP-G2QY] (describing potential claims at issue,
including hybrid speech and free exercise claims); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Symposium: AntiDiscrimination Laws Do Not Compel Commercial-Merchant Speech, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 14, 2017,
10:25 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/09/symposium-anti-discrimination-laws-not-compelcommercial-merchant-speech/ [https://perma.cc/U8AT-P9NY] (describing the difference between
personal expression and corporate expression). Instead, the Court punted on the substance of the
claim, leaving the constitutional questions for another day. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Section I.A.
12. See infra Section I.A.1.
13. See infra Section I.A.2.
14. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527
(2015) (arguing that conservative legal theorists have set the stage to embrace the economic rights
doctrine underlying the Lochner decision); Sepper, supra note 2, at 1518 (arguing that corporate First
Amendment rights “suggest[s] a religious freedom regime that protects rich, powerful, and
mainstream entities while burdening poor, vulnerable, and minority individuals”); Strine, supra note
2, at 431–32 (“In sum, although courts have been more receptive to business litigants seeking to
overturn the decisions of the political branches, the more intensive judicial scrutiny traditionally given
to legislative policies that are disadvantageous to minority groups and women has seemed to relax.”).
15. Much of the extensive scholarship on corporate rights focuses on carefully laying out the U.S.
Supreme Court’s missteps in this area and urging reconsideration. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime & Reva
Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE
L.J. 2516, 2519 (2015) (critiquing the Court’s treatment of complicity-based claims); Pollman, supra
note 3 (critiquing effect of corporate rights on state law); Strine, supra note 2 (same); Amy J.
Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby’s
Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897 (2015) (proposing a revised balancing test for complicity claims).

10 - Hardee.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

3/25/2019 8:36 PM

VEIL PIERCING AND THE POWER OF STATE COURTS

221

be reformed to maintain the balance between corporations and their
employees and third parties. In doing so, this Article builds on, and
contributes to, an emerging body of scholarship that urges a more
muscular use of state corporate law in response to federal
encroachments.16
Corporations are creatures of state law.17 The Court recognized this
when it directed state corporate law to flesh out the free speech and free
exercise rights it granted to corporations.18 Scholars have noted that state
corporate law was not designed for this Court-mandated task, but rather
evolved to allow maximum flexibility to private ordering between
shareholders and management.19 In addition, states have the power to
define what constitutes a corporation and what actions fall outside the
corporate purview.20 So far it has been unclear whether or how these new
corporate rights alter this traditional power of states to define the
corporation. First, both Citizens United and Hobby Lobby make
statements regarding the nature of existing state corporate law that
scholars have challenged on factual grounds.21 Moreover, it is unclear
whether the Court’s pronouncements about the way state corporate law is
are in fact statements about the way corporate law must be under the
Constitution.22
The uncertainty in the Court’s doctrine creates a threat of a creeping
federalization of state corporate law if states blindly assimilate corporate
rights into existing doctrine. States concerned with growing corporate
power should actively engage with these new federal rights to find a new

16. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010) (arguing that state corporate law should create special
decision-making rules for corporate political speech); Buccola, supra note 5 (providing justification
for state power in this area); Joseph K. Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith, 86 U.
COLO. L. REV. 477 (2015) (arguing that political expenditures could constitute bad faith under state
corporate law).
17. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 644 (noting that “corporate law developed primarily as a matter
of state statutory and common law”).
18. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (“State
corporate law provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts [about the corporation’s religion]
by, for example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing structure.”); Citizens United
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010) (holding that “procedures of corporate democracy” will determine
who speaks for the corporation).
19. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 639 (arguing that corporate rights place “a new reliance on state
corporate law that gives a quasi-constitutional dimension to governance rules that were developed in
a different era and with a different focus”); infra Section II.B.
20. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 598–99.
21. See infra Section II.B.
22. See infra Section II.B.
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equilibrium that balances the need for corporate flexibility with the desire
to protect vulnerable citizens.23 In doing so, states can use their traditional
power to define corporate law to force clarification by the federal courts.24
An ideal test case would utilize an existing common law doctrine that can
be adapted to protect third parties without dramatic changes to the internal
governance rules of the corporation.25
This Article proposes that states could adapt the existing doctrine of
veil piercing to use in circumstances when shareholders have claimed
religious exemptions from neutrally applicable laws. Veil piercing—the
practice of disregarding the limited liability shield of the corporation and
exposing shareholders to personal liability—is appropriate when there is
“such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the
corporation and the individual no longer exist.”26 A shareholder claiming
an exemption to a neutrally applicable law by utilizing the corporation as
a vehicle with which to exercise their personal rights arguably displays
just such unity of interest, at least with respect to certain creditors or
claims.27 States have defined limited liability as available only to
shareholders who maintain a separation from their corporation and who
use the corporation to further the corporation’s ends rather than for
personal purposes.28 Thus, courts should take into account a shareholder’s
prior professed unity with their corporation and their use of the
corporation to pursue purely personal ends when the same shareholder
seeks to use the corporation to shield their personal assets.29
In addition to finding substantial support in existing veil piercing
doctrine, this proposal has several practical benefits. First, veil piercing
involves adjudicating the rights of third parties, so states should not feel
compelled by the internal affairs doctrine to apply the law of the state of
incorporation.30 This prevents opportunistic shareholders from
incorporating in another state while still harming the citizens of the states
where they do business. Second, because veil piercing is an equitable
common law doctrine, state courts can, through incremental changes,
23. See infra Section II.C.
24. See infra Section II.C.
25. See infra Part III.
26. Automotriz Del Golfo De Cal. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 63 (Cal. 1957).
27. See infra Section III.B.1.
28. See infra Section III.A.
29. See infra Section III.B.1.
30. See Gregory S. Crespi, Choice of Law in Veil-Piercing Litigation: Why Courts Should Discard
the Internal Affairs Rule and Embrace General Choice of Law Principles, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 85 (2008); infra Section III.C.1.
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clearly and thoughtfully develop a body of law in response to new
corporate rights.31 Although any action by state courts to minimize the
impact of expanded federal corporate rights is likely to meet stiff
opposition, clarification of state law regarding corporate structure and
purpose will, at the very least, force the U.S. Supreme Court to be upfront
about the extent to which it intends to federalize corporate law.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes how recent
decisions by the Supreme Court granting corporate rights have expanded
the power of corporations, tipping the balance of power in favor of
corporate elites over traditionally disadvantaged groups. Although some
scholars hold out hope that corporate social responsibility will rebalance
power, this Part argues that by allowing corporate management to thwart
external regulation, corporate rights remove the only remaining check on
the power of corporate insiders. Part II examines the traditional power of
states to create and define corporations and explores how the Court’s
recent rights decisions encroach on that power. It concludes by advocating
that states that are concerned about the negative impact of corporate
exemptions to laws designed to protect third parties should reassert their
power to define corporate structure and purpose to discourage
corporations from claiming such exemptions. Finally, Part III provides a
roadmap for how states can reassert themselves. It argues that when
engaging in a veil piercing analysis, state courts should take into account
the fact that a shareholder has claimed a prior exemption to the law based
on a unity of interest between shareholder and corporation. This is not
only a doctrinally sound adaptation to personal exemptions for
corporations, but it also has practical advantages that may help states
better defend themselves when challenged in federal court. While the
outcome of any proposal to discourage corporations from claiming rightsbased exemptions is uncertain, states’ assertion of their own authority
will, at the very least, force the U.S. Supreme Court to be transparent
about the lengths to which it intends to federalize corporate law.
I.

THE EXPANDING POWER OF CORPORATIONS

Scholars have accused the Roberts Court of ushering in a quiet
revolution that is turning Carolene Products footnote four on its head.32
31. See infra Section III.C.2.
32. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”).
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Rather than protecting “discrete and insular minorities,” they argue the
Court is wielding its anti-majoritarian power to protect “corporate
elites.”33 The Court has issued several landmark rulings with respect to
corporate power, most notably Citizens United v. FEC and Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., which gave corporations a right to evade
democratically imposed mandates. Critics argue that these cases, taken
together with the Court’s opinions on labor unions34 and voting rights,35
have served to expand the power of corporations and advance an antiregulatory agenda at the expense of the democratic power of women,
people of color, and the poor.36
Some believe that the Court’s denouncement of the shareholder profit
maximization principle in Hobby Lobby paves the way for corporations to
exercise these corporate rights on behalf of other stakeholders, leading to
more corporate social responsibility.37 This hope seems unlikely to
materialize, however, when considering where the Court located the
ability to exercise these rights and the practical realities of corporate
governance.38
A.

Corporate Rights: Increasing the Power of the Powerful

1.

Campaign Finance

The issue of campaign finance naturally holds a central position in
debates over wealth and the balance of power in society. Campaign
donations and independent expenditures on behalf of political candidates
make politicians more responsive to donor needs.39 In addition, the sheer
33. See, e.g., Sepper, supra note 2, at 1510 (“For-profit corporations are not the insular or religious
minority individuals of past accommodations, but politically powerful religious and commercial
entities—the very centerpiece of regulatory efforts.” (citation omitted)); Strine, supra note 2, at 431
(noting that under Carolene Products, courts intervened to protect those who “could not sufficiently
protect themselves at the ballot box” but now “federal courts appear more inclined to come up with
reasons to upset the determination of political branches” for “those with the most resources—such as
business corporations”). But see Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism,
116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 1916 (2016) (arguing that U.S. Supreme Court has long used the First
Amendment in a “Lochnerian” fashion).
34. See infra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
35. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 579 (2013) (striking down key portions of the Voting Rights Act).
36. See generally Sepper, supra note 2; Strine, supra note 2.
37. See Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 804 (2015)
(arguing that Hobby Lobby embraces a progressive view of the corporation).
38. See infra Section I.B.
39. See Albert W. Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions After McCutcheon, Citizens United,
and SpeechNow, 67 FLA. L. REV. 389, 425 (2015) (noting that campaign contributions influence
politicians). Even within the Citizens United opinion itself, Justice Kennedy recognized that “[i]t is
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amount of money in the political system shapes the discourse because the
fundraising needs of all candidates make both parties responsive to
moneyed interests.40
Some scholars see Citizens United as the Roberts Court’s first step in
expanding control by the wealthy over American politics by allowing
unlimited expenditures in support of a candidate directly from corporate
coffers.41 In that case, the majority exceeded even the plaintiff’s request
for relief and struck down the McCain-Feingold Act’s prohibition on
corporate expenditures as facially invalid because corporations have a
First Amendment right to speak.42 The Court clarified that its holding
applies not just to nonprofit corporations created to convey a message,
such as the plaintiff in the case, but also to for-profit corporations,
including public corporations.43
The ability to exercise this corporate speech right was vested in the
board of directors, who have the power under corporate law to make
decisions on behalf of the corporation and its shareholders.44 It is
important to note that directors of public corporations as a class are
notoriously unrepresentative of society at large.45 Public company
in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor
the voters and contributors who support those policies.” Id. at 427 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010)).
40. Strine, supra note 2, at 445 (noting that “[w]hen money matters, candidates must find it to win,”
which creates an agenda driven by the fact that “both parties must look to moneyed interests for their
political survival”).
41. Id. at 433 (“As is well known, the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United gave
corporations the ability to influence the political process more directly, which has therefore in turn
made elected officials more responsive to moneyed interests, and therefore, as a matter of logic, less
responsive to less wealthy citizens.”).
42. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 327 (rejecting narrow holding); Eric W. Orts, Theorizing the Firm:
Organizational Ontology in the Supreme Court, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 559, 580 (2016) (noting the
Court’s broad holding).
43. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362.
44. Id. (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)) (The Bellotti opinion
describes the corporate procedures as the shareholders’ ability to elect the board of directors, who
manage the corporation, and to sue for breaches of fiduciary duty). Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794–95; see
also Catherine A. Hardee, Who’s Causing the Harm, 106 KY. L.J. 751 (2018).
45. A 2016 report found that over 85% of Fortune 500 company directors are white, while fewer
than 8% are African American and 3.5% are Hispanic/Latinx. Women make up only 20% of boards.
ALL. FOR BD. DIVERSITY, MISSING PIECES REPORT: THE 2016 BOARD DIVERSITY CENSUS OF WOMEN
AND
MINORITIES
ON
FORTUNE
500
BOARDS
13
(2016),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/center-for-board-effectiveness/articles/board-diversitycensus-missing-pieces.html?id=us:2el:3dp:adbcenpr16:awa:ccg:020617
[https://perma.cc/LL4B7N8L]; see also Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much
Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 379 (2014) (providing statistics on the
lack of diversity on corporate boards).
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shareholders—the more representative body of the corporation—have
little to no influence over corporate decisions.46
As the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court has noted,
Delaware law “requires corporate directors to manage the corporation in
the best interests of the corporation’s stockholders.”47 The only goal that
all shareholders of a corporation can be certain to share is the desire for
corporate profit.48 Profit maximization suggests that corporations “will
focus any involvement in the political process on electing candidates who
will support public policies favorable to corporate interests,” including
fewer regulations, or regulations that benefit their industry or company,
and lower taxes.49 Focusing primarily on shareholder profits, however,
may not align with many, or even most, shareholders’ overall values.
Unlike corporations, humans have a wide variety of interests, which
manifest themselves in virtually infinite sets of preferences.50 However,
this does not mean that directors may never consider other interests.
Directors still have broad discretion under the business judgment rule to
support environmental, labor, or social issues so long as such support is
couched in a belief that it is in the long-term interest of the company.51
The evidence regarding the impact of the Citizens United decision is
mixed. Some argue that the decision may not have actually led to an
increase in political expenditures made directly by public corporations.52
Others have pointed out that there were undoubtedly massive increases in
spending after the decision and that much of that spending was “dark
money,” i.e., money that cannot be traced to its source.53 Much of this
dark money “was funneled through trade associations like the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce,” leading to a “deep suspicion that much of this
46. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L.
REV. 995, 1037 (1998) (describing how shareholder votes are structurally designed to largely favor
management); Strine, supra note 2, at 443–44 (noting that most shareholders own stock through
intermediaries such as mutual or pension funds and therefore do not have the right to vote or to sell
their stocks).
47. Strine, supra note 2, at 440.
48. Greenwood, supra note 46, at 1049 (“While real people must balance competing
interests . . . corporations . . . just maximize shareholder value.”); Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 347.
49. Strine, supra note 2, at 441.
50. See Greenwood, supra note 46, at 998 (noting that “important and widely shared values conflict
or are self-contradictory” and citizens are faced with balancing different sets of values that might
conflict with corporate profits).
51. Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 347.
52. Alschuler, supra note 39, at 418 (arguing that there is little evidence that large corporations
made more independent expenditures on behalf of candidates after Citizens United).
53. CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, CORPORATE CITIZEN? AN ARGUMENT FOR THE SEPARATION OF
CORPORATION AND STATE 14 (2016).
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dark money came from corporations exercising their new Citizens United
rights to spend.”54 We may never know how big of a part direct corporate
spending has played in the massive increases in election spending and
increasing influence by wealthy donors, including business leaders.55 In
addition, the Court’s reasoning was used to strike down other campaign
finance restrictions, most notably by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in
SpeechNow.org v. FEC,56 invalidating contribution limits to Super PACs,
and later by the Court in McCutcheon v. FEC57 to do away with the
aggregate limits on contributions to candidates or PACs.58
Regardless of its origins, money undoubtedly influences the political
system. Business leaders report that they believe that the campaign
finance system is “pay-to-play.”59 There is evidence that business leaders
and the corporations they run are pressured to donate to politicians to
avoid unfavorable political action against the company’s interests.60 The
pressure to donate to ensure business interests are protected helps to
explain why business groups, individual corporations, and their
executives donate to both major political parties in large amounts.61 The
effect of such spending ensures that both political parties are responsive
to corporate interests.

54. Id.; see also id. at 14–15 (describing inadvertent disclosures of corporate spending via lawsuits
and bankruptcy filings that confirm that at least some of this dark money originated from
corporations).
55. Id. (describing exponential increases in election spending after Citizens United, but noting that
direct contributions to campaigns from large public corporations did not increase); Strine, supra note
2, at 437 (noting that not all the increase is spending comes from corporations, but that the increase
in spending is linked to corporate influence).
56. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
57. 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
58. See Alschuler, supra note 39, at 393 (“A super PAC is a political action committee that does
not contribute to the official campaigns of candidates for office but instead prepares and places its
own advertisements supporting candidates and/or disparaging their opponents.”). Professor Alschuler
describes how Citizens United was used by the D.C. Circuit in SpeechNow.org v. FEC to strike down
any limits on donations to super PACs. Id.; see also Strine, supra note 2, at 437–38.
59. See Jennifer Mueller, The Unwilling Donor, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1783, 1816 (2015) (“A 2013
poll of 302 business leaders by the non-partisan Committee for Economic Development found that
seventy-five percent of respondents reported that the U.S. campaign finance system is ‘pay-to-play,’
and sixty-four percent believe it is a serious problem.”).
60. See id. at 1817–18 (describing the unwilling donor and pressure put on business executives by
legislators).
61. Id. at 1814 (noting that individuals and PACs donate to both parties in large amounts).
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The increase in campaign spending leaves the poor with less influence
in the political process. The cost of elections has gone up dramatically.62
As a natural corollary, the cost of access to politicians has risen as well.63
For example, one study unambiguously demonstrated that elected
representatives and their senior staffers are willing to meet “considerably
more frequently” with donors than non-donor constituents.64 This result is
not surprising as politicians are forced to spend increasing amounts of
time raising campaign funds.65 The need to fundraise means that
politicians on both sides of the aisle must be responsive to moneyed
interests in crafting their agendas.66
2.

Religious Exemptions

Corporate influence over the political process is exacerbated by
allowing corporations religious exemptions to neutrally applicable laws
and regulations that survive the democratic process. The ability of
corporations to claim exemptions to the law based on the religious beliefs
of corporate owners provides an avenue to erode democratically enacted
protections.67 It is especially worrisome because the religious exemptions
claimed by corporations thus far are broader than traditional religious
claims. These claims generally involve “religious objections to being
made complicit in the assertedly sinful conduct of others.”68 Such
62. See Alschuler, supra note 39, at 418 (describing the “stunning increase” in spending following
Citizens United and SpeechNow, with spending on elections nearly tripling in the elections
immediately following the cases).
63. See, e.g., Editorial, The Soaring Price of Political Access, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/opinion/sunday/the-soaring-price-of-political-access.html
[https://perma.cc/KF97-EPP3] (reporting that both parties planned to increase tenfold the cost of
exclusive dinners with candidates and party leaders, with Republicans charging $1.34 million per
couple, and Democrats charging $1.6 million).
64. Mueller, supra note 59, at 1816–17 (describing study).
65. See Ezra Klein, The Most Depressing Graphic for Members of Congress, WASH. POST (Jan.
14,
2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/14/the-most-depressinggraphic-for-members-of-congress/?utm_term=.302bb0f829a9
[https://perma.cc/XB5H-ZUXZ]
(discussing a leaked Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee document that suggests
spending four hours a day on fundraising calls and additional time on “constituent visits” and
“strategic outreach,” which also likely includes time with donors).
66. Strine, supra note 2, at 445; TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 53, at 59 (describing the
phenomenon of corporate donors making donations to both parties to insure influence); id. at 61–62
(quoting candidates and others discussing the influence of money on political agendas).
67. See Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22 AM. U. J.
GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 303, 305 (2014) [hereinafter Sepper, Contraception] (noting that giving
secular corporations the same exemptions as religious organizations risks eroding “gender equality
and religious freedom in all workplaces”).
68. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 15, at 2519.
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“complicity-based conscience claims” do not involve actions by the
corporation but rather focus on a third party’s conduct and the claimant’s
belief that the lawful conduct of that third party is sinful.69 In Hobby
Lobby, petitioners’ claim was not that they were required to use certain
contraception. Instead they objected to paying for insurance that some
employees, in connection with their doctors, might utilize to purchase
forms of contraception that petitioners believed were sinful.70 Similarly,
in Masterpiece Cakeshop, petitioner argued that decorating a cake for a
gay wedding makes him complicit in what he views as a sinful marriage.71
Complicity-based religious claims have the potential to cause great
harm to third parties.72 In the employment context, these claims require
an employee to make a particular decision with which the corporate
employer disagrees, thus they necessarily involve subordinating the
employee’s right “to make his or her own moral decisions.”73 As such, the
ability for corporations to raise complicity-based claims has the potential
to put much more of employees’ lives under the influence of their
employers.74 When the believed sinful conduct is engaged in by members
of the public, the burden of the corporation’s exemption falls on that
group. When large numbers of exemptions are claimed alleging sinful
behavior by a discrete group, “accommodating the claim has the
distinctive power to stigmatize and demean third parties.”75

69. See id.; Sepinwall, supra note 15, at 1905.
70. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014).
71. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1724 (2018).
72. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 15, at 2527 (“Complicity-based conscience claims are
oriented toward third parties who do not share the claimant’s beliefs about the conduct in question.
For this reason, their accommodation has distinctive potential to impose material and dignitary harm
on those the claimants condemn.”); Sepinwall, supra note 15, at 1973 (arguing that complicity claims’
potential for third party harms means courts should focus on balancing third party costs rather than
the scope of complicity).
73. Sepper, Contraception, supra note 67, at 337.
74. There is historical precedent for massive intrusion on employees’ personal lives based on the
employer’s desire to cabin the sins of employees. See Strine, supra note 4, at 79 (describing how
employers in the late nineteenth century mandated church attendance and dictated moral standards to
employees, including how to maintain their appearance and how to spend their wages). More recent
examples include unsuccessful efforts by corporations to avoid anti-discrimination laws on religious
grounds in order to force employees to attend trainings that teach that “women’s place is in the home”
and to discriminate against non-Christians, gays, and “women working without the consent of their
fathers or husbands.” Sepper, supra note 2, at 1515–16.
75. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 15, at 2566; see Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727
(recognizing that widespread refusal to serve gay couples would “result[] in a community-wide stigma
inconsistent with the history and dynamics of civil rights laws”).
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Religious exemptions by corporations have thus far largely come at the
expense of the reproductive and privacy rights of female employees and
are particularly burdensome on low-income employees.76 Religious
exemptions by corporations are not necessarily limited to women’s
reproductive issues, however. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court left
open the possibility that corporations serving the public may have a Free
Exercise right to thwart anti-discrimination public accommodation laws,
with three Justices strongly signaling they would favor such an
exemption.77
Even if limited to the statutory exemptions under RFRA in Hobby
Lobby, religious exemptions by corporations have the potential to
undermine regulatory efforts across the board as settled legal questions
about the ability of the law to regulate the employer–employee
relationship are thrown into doubt.78 In Hobby Lobby, the majority
dismissed these potential harms to employees by noting that the
government could achieve the goal of universal contraceptive coverage
by simply utilizing a workaround or by providing coverage as a
government benefit.79 The majority noted that the statute already contains
such a workaround for religious nonprofit employers, requiring insurance
companies to provide contraceptive coverage to employees of objecting
religious nonprofits free of charge.80 In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy
relied heavily on the availability of this workaround as a less restrictive
means of accomplishing the mandate’s goals.81
76. The contraceptive mandate in the Affordable Care Act was designed to ensure access to
contraceptive care for poor and low-income women by removing the cost barrier, including co-pays.
See Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, The Union of Contraceptive Services and the Affordable Care Act Gives
Birth to First Amendment Concerns, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 539, 540–44 (2013) (summarizing
evidence in favor of contraceptive mandate). Contraceptive coverage provides myriad health benefits
to women, including avoiding unintended pregnancies and ensuring healthier intended pregnancies.
See id. at 541–42; Seema Mohapatra, Time to Lift the Veil of Inequality in Health-Care Coverage:
Using Corporate Law to Defend the Affordable Care Act, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 137, 179 (2015);
Sepper, Contraception, supra note 67, at 336.
77. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1734–40 (Gorsuch, J., joined by Alito, J., concurring);
id. at 1740–48 (Thomas, J., joined by Gorsuch, J., concurring).
78. See Sepper, supra note 2, at 1513 (noting that enjoining the contraceptive mandate injects a
“formalist view of employment relations into religious liberty doctrine [that] calls into question the
regulation of employers”).
79. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781–82 (2014). At
oral argument for Masterpiece Cakeshop, several Justices appeared to embrace a similar argument
that there is no harm from businesses discriminating against the LGBTQ community so long as they
can buy the same item from a different establishment. Transcript of Oral Argument at 62–64,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
80. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782–83.
81. Id. at 2787.
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Even if the harm from religious exemptions could be ameliorated by
direct government provisions of benefits or through exemptions to the
regulatory framework, these are frequently not a practical option.
Government-provided health insurance has thus far proven politically
impossible and a separate program to provide government-funded
contraceptive coverage to all women seems even less likely. In addition,
exemptions make general regulations more expensive to administer and
implement, making regulations less likely to be adopted.82
That may, in fact, be the larger goal of advocates for complicity-based
conscience claims. Unlike traditional exemptions claimed by religious
minorities seeking to engage in religious practices disfavored by the
majority, these claims are “asserted in society-wide conflicts by mobilized
groups and individuals acting in coalitions that reach across religious
denominational lines and in coordination with a political party.”83 This
coalition includes two major religious groups—Catholics and Evangelical
Protestants—who have joined together with the Republican Party since
the late 1970s in an attempt to reestablish laws relating to traditional moral
views on sexuality, abortion, and contraception.84 When the legislative
process fails to provide an avenue to “chang[e] the sexual mores of the
wider community . . . [s]eeking an exemption to avoid complicity in the
sins of others can serve the same end.”85 Accommodating such claims
allows claimants to preserve prior legal restrictions on the “sinful”
activities of disfavored groups by recharacterizing the private policing of
such behavior as necessary to support religious pluralism.86
The financial power of corporations who could claim exemptions
should not be underestimated. The Court in Hobby Lobby does not define
“closely held corporation,”87 but the corporations in the case demonstrate
82. See Strine, supra note 2, at 458–59 (noting that “carve-outs and work-arounds” increase costs
and lessen accountability and efficiency of government programs).
83. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 15, at 2542–43.
84. See id. at 2544–52 (detailing decades-long campaign organized by religious groups in
connection with the Republican party).
85. Id. at 2552.
86. Professors Nejaime and Siegel refer to this process as “preservation through transformation.”
Id. at 2553 (“Accommodating complicity-based conscience claims in these circumstances may
function to enable ‘preservation through transformation’: when an existing legal regime is
successfully challenged so that its rules and reasons no longer seem persuasive or legitimate,
defenders may adopt new rules and reasons that preserve elements of the challenged regime.”).
87. Indeed, there is no single definition of closely held corporation. See Elizabeth Pollman,
Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 149,
163–64 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë Robinson eds., 2016) [hereinafter Pollman,
Corporate Law] (noting that there is no single definition for the term in corporate law and the U.S.
Supreme Court utilized a “general understanding” of the term).
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that the label does not limit the holding to “small businesses.”88 Any
corporation whose controlling shareholders agree to run the corporation
according to the same religious tenets may be able to claim an
exemption.89 The most likely types of corporations to fit this bill are
family-controlled corporations, like Hobby Lobby. These corporations are
significant drivers in our economy.90 More than 30% of all companies
with sales in excess of one billion dollars are family-controlled
enterprises.91
Even smaller “mom and pop” shops like Masterpiece Cakeshop—
owned by a married couple—represent a powerful force. The owners of
88. At the time of the case, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. had more than 13,000 employees and
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. employed 950 people, making neither company a “small business”
under the Small Business Association’s definition. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S.
__, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764, 2765 (2014); see also U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS 1 (2012) [hereinafter FAQ], https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ_Sept_2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BD75-LXUU] (defining a small business as any business having fewer than 500
employees). Mardel employed almost 400 people at the time of the case, making it the only “small
business” involved. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765.
89. There is no definition of closely held corporations in either the opinion or in the law, but the
Court found that the corporations at issue qualified for the mandate because they were “owned and
controlled by members of a single family, and no one has disputed the sincerity of their religious
beliefs.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774. This suggests that to qualify for an exemption, a
corporation’s shareholders must have the same sincerely held religious beliefs. See Jennifer S. Taub,
Is Hobby Lobby A Tool for Limiting Corporate Constitutional Rights?, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 403,
426–27 (2015).
90. See Hardee, supra note 44, at 755–57 (describing economic impact of small and family-run
businesses).
91. Nicolas Kachaner, George Stalk, Jr. & Alain Block, What You Can Learn from Family
Business, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2012, at 103, 103. The Court in Hobby Lobby refused to exclude
the possibility of an exemption for publicly held corporations, merely noting that such corporations
are unlikely to claim exemptions for “practical” reasons—namely that unrelated shareholders would
be unlikely to agree to it. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774. It is perhaps not so unlikely though. One
third of S&P 500 companies have some level of family control. Claudio Fernández-Aráoz, Sonny
Iqbal & Jörg Ritter, Leadership Lessons from Great Family Businesses, HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 2015,
at 83, 84. For example, Tyson Foods was founded by a devout Christian whose grandson is now the
CEO. The company is a public company, but the family’s religious influence can be seen in the
company providing 120 chaplains to minister to employees and donating 25,000 booklets that “guide
families through the process of saying grace at the dinner table.” Justin Rohrlich, Religious CEOs:
Tyson Foods’ John Tyson, MINYANVILLE (May 19, 2010), http://www.minyanville.com/specialfeatures/articles/john-tyson-christian-church-chaplain-methodist/5/19/2010/id/28276
[https://perma.cc/99U6-9KF4]. The Court left open whether unanimity is required among voting
shareholders, but the fact that the Court did not even reference Hobby Lobby’s nonvoting
shareholders suggests that a public corporation with significant nonvoting stock could still qualify.
Going public with few voting shareholders and large swaths of nonvoting shareholders has been a
practice for family businesses and is growing in popularity with other companies. See Keith Griffith,
Viacom and 27 Other Stocks That Come with Restricted Voting Rights, THESTREET (June 23, 2016,
10:55 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13612197/1/viacom-and-27-other-stocks-that-comewith-restricted-voting-rights.html [https://perma.cc/3Q2L-62UP].

10 - Hardee.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

3/25/2019 8:36 PM

VEIL PIERCING AND THE POWER OF STATE COURTS

233

Masterpiece Cakeshop have been portrayed by some as powerless victims,
and it is true that they have fewer resources than the families who own the
multi-million dollar corporations in Hobby Lobby.92 However, even the
individual owners of small businesses are in a position of power over their
employees, and when taken collectively, they employ nearly half of
America’s workforce.93 This has the potential to give a more economically
elite class the ability to regulate the sexual choices of a large percentage
of Americans, even when the democratic process has determined that such
choices are protected.94 Representing nearly 43% of private sector output,
small businesses likewise provide a significant portion of public goods
and services.95 Collective action by even a small percentage of such
businesses can impose significant economic and dignitary harm on those
engaged in protected behavior that is deemed “sinful” by business
owners.96 By giving corporations the power to police the “sinful” behavior
of their employees and third parties, the Roberts Court is again, on
balance, taking the side of the more economically powerful party.
Although Hobby Lobby and Citizens United each create corporate
rights, the former differs from the campaign finance decisions in that it
gives the power to claim an exemption to the shareholders rather than the
board of directors.97 The effect of both cases is the same: they concentrate
92. See, e.g., James Gottry, Bakers Should Be Allowed to Have Their Cake—and Their Freedom,
HILL (Oct. 13, 2017, 2:20 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/355341-bakers-should-beallowed-to-have-their-cake-and-their-freedom [https://perma.cc/9NGP-3AN9] (giving sympathetic
profile of Jack Phillips and noting the loss to his business); George F. Will, A Cake Is Food, Not
Speech.
But
Why
Bully
the
Baker?,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
1,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-cake-is-food-not-speech-but-why-bully-thebaker/2017/12/01/7e05773c-d5f0-11e7-b62d-d9345ced896d_story.html?utm_term=.14417909e547
[https://perma.cc/FE6P-F8NH] (arguing that it was “nasty” for the gay couple to “sic[] the
government” on Phillips and noting that Phillips has lost 40% of his business because he stopped
making wedding cakes to comply with the law).
93. See FAQ, supra note 88, at 1; Hardee, supra note 44, at 755–57 (describing economic power
of small businesses).
94. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 15, at 2556 (arguing that “conscience provisions allow
advocates to rework a traditional norm that was once enforced through the criminal law into a norm
that is now enforced through a web of exemptions in the civil law”).
95. See FAQ, supra note 88, at 1 (42.9%).
96. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 15, at 2566 (“When a religious claim objecting to others’
sinful conduct is based on a traditional norm that is reiterated by a mass movement over time and
across social domains, accommodating the claim has the distinctive power to stigmatize and demean
third parties.”). This is especially true when corporations in a geographic area band together to target
a disfavored group. See id.
97. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (“[P]rotecting
the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the
religious liberty of the humans who own and control those companies.”). See Hardee, supra note 44,
at 770–78 (arguing Court has created an aggregate utility theory of the corporation by which
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the ability to wield corporate power in the most elite hands—the owners
of a closely held corporation and the management of a public corporation.
This concentration of corporate power in the hands of the few stands in
stark contrast to the Court’s treatment of labor unions.98 The Court in
Citizens United allows management to use shareholder funds to speak on
behalf of the corporation regardless of individual shareholder agreement.
With respect to labor unions, the Roberts Court has only strengthened the
ability of employees to withhold funds from unions that bargain on their
behalf.99 While discussed in terms of protecting employee speech rights,
the effect is to disperse power to each individual employee or member,
leaving the union as an entity weaker. In other words, corporations may
draw in and concentrate the rights and economic power of its constituent
members and wield that power through the corporate form, while labor
unions are not afforded that option.
B.

Corporate Social Responsibility Will Not Rebalance Power

Some scholars hope that the Hobby Lobby decision contains the
solution to the problem of corporations utilizing the power of the
corporate form to reinforce power imbalances in society. 100 In the Hobby
Lobby opinion, the Court stated for the first time that corporate purpose is
not limited to the pursuit of profit.101 Some advocates of increased
corporate social responsibility (CSR) have heralded this decision as a
victory for CSR.102 The CSR movement has long tried to encourage
shareholders may use the corporation to further their personal ends); Pollman, supra note 87, at 165–
66 (describing the corporation as a tool to be used by the shareholders to exercise their ends). This
distinction is critical in the veil piercing analysis. See infra Section III.B.1.
98. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens
United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 819–27 (2012) (describing differences between treatment of
corporate and union expenditures); Strine, supra note 2, at 450–53.
99. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2459 (2018); Strine, supra note 2, at 452 (noting that “the Roberts Court ha[s], if anything, widened the
gap [between corporations and labor unions] and made it more difficult for unions to exercise voice”).
100. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 37, at 804 (praising Hobby Lobby as “a ringing endorsement
of the stakeholder conception of the corporation that many liberals and progressives prefer”); Lyman
Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 22 (2014) (calling the
Hobby Lobby opinion “a landmark in corporate law” that furthers the CSR movement).
101. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770–71 (“While it is certainly true that a central objective of forprofit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations
to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so.”).
102. See McDonnell, supra note 37, at 804. Even among supporters, there is some criticism of the
case on CSR grounds, as the opinion still requires that shareholders approve of the social purpose of
the corporation rather than a stronger version of the stakeholder model, which would allow
management to consider non-shareholders without shareholder approval. Id. at 804–05.
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corporations to exceed the minimum standards owed to non-shareholder
corporate stakeholders, including employees, the environment, and
society as a whole.103
Advocates of CSR are frequently critiqued by conservative corporate
scholars who argue that shareholders are the only corporate constituency
with the power to hold management accountable, and thus, the only group
to whom the board of directors owe fiduciary duties.104 Because the only
common interest among all shareholders is a desire for profit, they argue
that is the only appropriate goal for the corporation.105 This requirement
that corporate purpose be limited to the pursuit of profits is commonly
referred to as the shareholder profit maximization theory.106
Even conservative corporate scholars agree, however, that if
management believes that exceeding regulatory standards, promoting
labor’s interests, or donating to social causes will be in the best interest of
the corporation and its shareholders in the long term, management is free
to enact such policies.107 Management has broad discretion under the
business judgment rule to make such determinations, with courts very
rarely finding liability for socially conscious acts by corporations or even
large charitable donations made by corporations.108 Management need
only couch their discretion to do so in terms that prioritize shareholders’
common interest in profiting from their investment in the corporation.109
103. See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate Social
Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605 (2001) (providing an excellent history of CSR movement
through the modern governance movement); Cheryl L. Wade, Effective Compliance with
Antidiscrimination Law: Corporate Personhood, Purpose and Social Responsibility, 74 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1187, 1192 (2017) (providing definitions of CSR).
104. Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 346–47 (summarizing conservative corporate law theory and
discussing scholars who favor it).
105. Id. at 351–52.
106. Id. at 347 (“Put simply, conservative corporate theory embraces the notion that seeking profit
for the stockholders is the only proper end.”).
107. See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 273 (1992) (noting that the differences between CSR and profit maximization
can be largely “papered over” because of the broad latitude given to management to determine what
is best for the long term interests of the company); Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 347 (“Under this
theory, that does not mean that corporate managers cannot consider other constituencies and interests
affected by the corporation’s conduct—such as employees, customers, communities in which it
operates, and society generally—but it does mean that they can only do so when that is instrumental
to profit generation.”).
108. Management’s discretion is so broad that the claim for corporate waste is often referred to as
a “theoretical exception” to the business judgment rule. Large corporate donations have been
sanctioned by the courts. See Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991) (approving a donation valued
at over $140 million).
109. Take for example, Marriott’s decision to remove pay-per-view pornography from its hotel
rooms. The Marriott company was founded by a devout Mormon and the company has been
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Thus the shareholder profit maximization theory is not incompatible with
corporations engaging in the activities that CSR advocates.110
While the Court in Hobby Lobby explicitly rejects the premise that
corporations must be driven by profit motives alone, at least with respect
to some corporations, it is a mistake to read the decision as supporting
CSR. Religious exemptions do not involve shareholders exceeding the
minimum requirements of the law to further the interests of other
corporate stakeholders. Instead they permit shareholders to provide less
for other corporate stakeholders and the general public than the law
requires from their competitors in order to further the shareholders’ own
personal religious interests.111 The Hobby Lobby decision demonstrates
this: the shareholder families involved took away their employees’
statutory right to contraceptive coverage in order to further the family
members’ own religious interests.112
influenced by the Marriott family’s religious beliefs. See Kim Bhasin & Melanie Hicken, 17 Big
Companies That Are Intensely Religious, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 19, 2012, 11:29 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/17-big-companies-that-are-intensely-religious-2012-1#alaska-air-7
[https://perma.cc/NVP9-LZT9]. Two members of the Marriott family sit on the board of directors,
including the founder’s son who is the chairman of the board. See Board of Directors, MARRIOTT,
https://marriott.gcs-web.com/board-of-directors [https://perma.cc/6NR2-79SW]. J.W. Marriott, Jr.
was the CEO and Mitt Romney was serving on the Board of Directors when the decision to stop
selling pornography was made and, while that decision was likely in line with the religious beliefs of
the company’s leadership, it was justified on economic grounds. See Elia Gourgouris, Marriott Hotels
to Drop Pornographic Videos, DESERET NEWS (Feb. 1, 2011, 6:00 AM),
https://www.deseretnews.com/article/705365621/Marriott-hotels-to-drop-pornographic-videos.html
[https://perma.cc/NE7E-L37T] (praising the decision for its religious outcome but not the
corporation’s economic justification); Yitz Jordan, How Marriott’s Owner Put Aside His Mormon
Beliefs to Cash in on the LGBT Travel Market, QUARTZ (June 5, 2014), https://qz.com/216328/howmarriots-owner-put-aside-his-mormon-beliefs-to-cash-in-on-the-lgbt-travel-market/
[https://perma.cc/72MZ-69E5].
110. For example, the connection between social causes and the bottom line can be seen in the
history of Subaru’s marketing to, and financial support for, the LGBTQ movement. See Alex
Mayyasi, How Subarus Came to be Seen as Cars for Lesbians, ATLANTIC (June 22, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/how-subarus-came-to-be-seen-as-cars-forlesbians/488042/ [https://perma.cc/7QXE-LJM7] (describing Subaru’s marketing campaign to
lesbians and their financial support for LGBTQ causes). Likewise, Google has made massive
investments in renewable energy on the grounds that it is both a socially responsible choice and one
that provides the company with a financial advantage, both in terms of public relations and new
market generation.
111. See Mohapatra, supra note 76, at 180; Pollman, supra note 87, at 170 (“Whereas the pursuit
of corporate social responsibility often entails questions of whether the board of directors can put
nonshareholder interests ahead of those of shareholders in order to surpass legal compliance, the
pursuit of religious accommodation asks the law to bend around the shareholders’ will to avoid
generally applicable laws.”).
112. See Matthew T. Bodie, Faith and the Firm, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 609, 619 (2016) (“Rather
than simply an accommodation of one sincere religious belief, the case came across as one (powerful)
group trying to impose its religious beliefs on another (less powerful) group. As this played out in the
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Essentially, the decision retains the shareholders’ right to be selfinterested but gives them even more leeway to use the benefits of the
corporate form to further non-monetary self-interested pursuits, such as
exercising their personal religious beliefs.113 These self-interested pursuits
are not inherently bad; in fact, they can be seen as seeking to advance a
social good—e.g., protecting the sanctity of marriage, preserving fetal
life, promoting religious practices. These are certainly issues of public
import that some socially conscious corporations have sought to
advance.114 In a culture that values religious freedom and encourages a
multitude of viewpoints, such corporate activism should not be discounted
simply because it contradicts many liberal scholars’ personal political
views.115
CSR differs from religious exemptions, however, because with CSR
the corporation is necessarily furthering a social good that is not in conflict
with the law.116 Corporations are not permitted to substitute their
judgment about what is best for society by violating the law to further
what they believe to be a more important social end.117 In contrast, the
Hobby Lobby case, the five members of the Green family used their religious beliefs to defeat a
regulatory obligation to the 13,000-plus employees at the company.”).
113. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (describing
RFRA as providing protection for the individuals to exercise their personal beliefs). In the future such
exemptions could be expanded to include pursuit of personal artistic expression. Justice Thomas,
joined by Justice Gorsuch, argued in his concurrence in Masterpiece Cakeshop that Colorado’s public
accommodations law as applied to the petitioner violated his right to free exercise and free speech.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1740 (2018)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
114. See Rohrlich, supra note 91. The fast food corporation Chick-fil-A discovered that engaging
in CSR can be problematic when the restaurant chain came under fire for donating to organizations
that opposed same-sex marriage. While the company has backed away from such politically charged
topics, the company has retained its corporate purpose “[t]o glorify God by being a faithful steward
of all that is entrusted to us and to have a positive influence on all who come into contact with Chickfil-A” and still closes its stores on Sundays. Hayley Peterson, ‘Chick-fil-A Is About Food’: How
National Ambitions Led the Chain to Shed Its Polarizing Image, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 6, 2017, 7:42
AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/chick-fil-a-reinvents-itself-liberal-conservative-2017-5
[https://perma.cc/MHN3-VPWE].
115. See McDonnell, supra note 37, at 811–12 (arguing that liberals should embrace core values
of liberty and diversity, including protecting the viewpoints of conservative Christians).
116. See Wade, supra note 103, at 1189 (“While law compliance is mandated, the quality of that
compliance is within corporate officers’ discretion.”).
117. If allowing corporations to substitute their moral judgment for that of society falls within the
ambit of CSR, the Trump Administration’s rule allowing any company with a religious or moral
objection to contraception to avoid the requirements of the Affordable Care Act would be a major
victory for CSR. See Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (allowing any corporate entity to claim an
exemption from the contraceptive mandate on religious grounds); Moral Exemptions and
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Court in Hobby Lobby did not view the exemption as furthering a public
good. The Court specifically premised the exemption on the shareholders’
right to exercise their personal religion, not on the desired good for society
that their exercise of religion would create.118 Rather than furthering the
ability of corporations to advance the interests of other stakeholders, the
formal recognition by the Court that shareholders may pursue non-profitrelated purposes merely opened the door to claims that the corporate form
can be used to advance the shareholders’ interest at the expense of other
stakeholders.119
Critics of non-mandatory CSR argue that the fatal flaw in the concept
of corporations voluntarily putting other stakeholder interests over those
of shareholders is that it actually expands the power of management.120 In
practice, allowing management to consider corporate purposes other than
shareholder profit simply frees management from its accountability to the
only group within the corporation with power over them, namely the
shareholders.121 By embracing an expansive view of corporate purpose to
allow for religious exemptions by shareholders, the Court exacerbates this
flaw by removing the most powerful check on corporate authority outside
the corporation—regulation by the democratic process.122
Under the conservative theory of the corporation, for-profit
corporations are required to “stick to trying to make money within the

Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83
Fed. Reg. 57,592 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R.
pt. 147) (allowing small businesses to claim religious or moral exemptions to the contraceptive
mandate).
118. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (holding that the purpose of RFRA as it applies to
corporations is to protect the shareholder’s sincere religious beliefs).
119. See id. at 2770–71 (rejecting profit motive as the sole corporate purpose to justify the use of
the corporation to further shareholders’ religious beliefs); Johnson & Millon, supra note 100, at 22
(noting that allowing non-financial corporate purposes “was essential to the conclusion in Hobby
Lobby that business corporations can exercise religion”).
120. Mandatory CSR does not necessarily suffer from this flaw if other stakeholders are given a
seat at the table. For example, Germany’s two-tiered boards give labor a say in corporate management.
See infra note 211.
121. See A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365, 1367 (1932) (“Now I submit that you cannot abandon emphasis on ‘the view that business
corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders’ until such time as you
are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else.”);
Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 353 (describing concerns that “corporations would be dangerously
unaccountable if the managers were given broad discretion to pursue diverse ends”).
122. See Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 356 (noting that corporate law “looks to the political
process as the legitimate and sound form of protection” for dealing with negative externalities); infra
Section II.A.
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‘rules of the game’ set by the government.”123 Rather than changing that
paradigm to advance interests of stakeholders outside of the corporate
structure, corporate rights upset the balance established by flexibility for
private ordering within the corporation tempered by governmental
regulation of the corporation to limit negative externalities.124 The net
effect of corporate rights is not just to give corporations heightened ability
to influence what rules the government creates, but also to allow certain
shareholders to disregard the rules of the game to further their own
interests. This gives corporate elites—management who control public
corporations and the managing shareholders who control private
corporations—unprecedented power to wield using the corporate form.
II.

STATE LAW AND CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

The inability to curb the power of corporations through external
regulations is problematic for the balance of power developed over time
between states and corporations. This balance has evolved to provide
corporations great freedom within state corporate law to structure the
internal governance of the corporation, tempered by laws regulating the
negative externalities made possible by the corporate form. The Court has
upset that balance not just by the granting of corporate rights that provide
an avenue to sidestep certain regulatory efforts but also by placing
pressure on state corporate law to flesh out those rights. The matter is
complicated by the controversial understandings of state corporate law,
both explicit and implicit, in the Court’s opinions, leading to an open
question: how much do states retain of their traditional power to define
corporations? This Section argues that states should cautiously test their
power by pushing back against the creeping federalization of state
corporate law.
A.

State Law Defines a Corporation

Corporations are creatures of state law.125 Although the federal
government has the power to charter corporations and create a body of
federal corporate law, it has largely elected not to do so.126 Instead, states
123. Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 358.
124. See infra Section II.A.
125. 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 2.50 (rev. vol. 2015) [hereinafter FLETCHER CYC.] (“Modern corporations are creatures of statute,
deriving their existence and authority to act from the state.”).
126. Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments
in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 915–16 (1982) (describing efforts at
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create corporations by granting them charters under the law of the state of
incorporation.127 State corporate law, in turn, defines the corporations
chartered by the state, including defining the purpose of the corporation,
the rules that must be followed in governing the corporation, and which
rules the parties may alter by contract.128 With the grant of a corporate
charter, the corporation receives a panoply of benefits that come with the
corporate form, including perpetual life, limited liability for shareholders,
the right to hold and transfer property, the right to sue and contract in the
corporation’s name, and the ability to aggregate and lock capital into the
corporation.129 The principle underpinning most of these benefits is the
legal separation between the corporation and the humans associated with
it.130
Placing the power to create and define the governing law for
corporations in the hands of the states naturally results in competition
between the states for corporate charters and their resulting tax revenue.
Corporations are free to incorporate in any state or reincorporate in a
different state if they determine that another state’s corporate law is more
beneficial.131 The internal affairs doctrine provides that for issues relating
to the internal governance of the corporation, the law of the state of
incorporation governs.132 Thus, unlike the residency of a human being,
choosing a state of citizenship does not require corporations to “live” in
any sense in the state whose law they choose, making concerns about

federalization, but no result); Pollman, supra note 3, at 646. The federal government has been actively
involved in securities regulation, which is largely focused on investor protection rather than corporate
governance, with some limited exceptions. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 653–54.
127. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 644.
128. See id. at 650–51.
129. See id. at 645; Mitchell F. Crusto, Unconscious Classism: Entity Equality for Sole Proprietors,
11 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 215, 230 (2009) (describing the benefits of the corporate form that
unincorporated entities lack).
130. See Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of
Reconciling Citizens United with Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 887 (“A
business corporation is not simply ‘individual men and women’: it is a distinct entity that is separate
from its stockholders, managers, and creditors.”); Pollman, supra note 3, at 645 (“These advantages
were possible because of an essential characteristic of the corporation: it is a distinct legal entity,
separate from the humans associated with it—the shareholders, directors, employees, and creditors.”).
131. See Demetrios G. Kaouris, Is Delaware Still a Haven for Incorporation?, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L.
965, 966 (1995).
132. Crespi, supra note 30, at 96. Whether the internal affairs doctrine is merely a matter of comity
or is constitutionally mandated is a matter of debate, as is the breadth of what should be considered
an internal governance matter. See infra Section III.C.1.

10 - Hardee.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

3/25/2019 8:36 PM

VEIL PIERCING AND THE POWER OF STATE COURTS

241

quality of life or regulatory burdens outside of corporate governance
largely irrelevant.133
This mobility gives corporations a strong hand to play in terms of
encouraging states to create corporate law that is responsive to business
interests. A vigorous academic debate has long raged as to whether this
competition leads to a “race to the top” or a “race to the bottom” among
the states.134 Proponents of the “race to the bottom” characterization argue
that because the real power of a corporation lies with management,
competition leads to state corporate law favoring managers at the expense
of shareholder control.135 Critics of this view argue that, in fact,
competition between states gives investors more options and the rational
investor will choose to invest in corporations that are chartered in a state
whose law will allow for the maximization of their investment.136 Thus,
“permissive corporation law maximizes, rather than minimizes,
shareholders’ welfare” and state competition leads to a race to the top
rather than the bottom.137 Notably, for purposes of this Article, both
theories focus on whether competition creates the best, or worst,
relationship between management and shareholders. Questions of
whether state corporate law provides the best protection for parties outside
the corporate governance structure are largely disregarded when debating
state corporate law.138

133. See FLETCHER CYC., supra note 127, § 114 (“The domicile or place of creation and existence
of a foreign corporation is the state of incorporation, although its principal place of business may be
in the foreign state or states.”).
134. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974); Fischel, supra note 126. But see generally Kaouris, supra note 131 (arguing the
“race” is not really among the states but rather between the states and the threat of federal government
intervention).
135. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 134, at 666 (arguing that competition for charters and the resulting
“modernization” of corporate law has “watered the rights of shareholders vis-à-vis management down
to a thin gruel”).
136. See Fischel, supra note 126, at 919.
137. Id. at 919–20. The benefits to the corporation are not illusory—studies have shown that
reincorporation in Delaware can result in a higher stock price. See Fischel, supra note 126, at 920–
21; Kaouris, supra note 131, at 981.
138. See Timothy P. Glynn, Communities and Their Corporations: Towards a Stakeholder
Conception of the Production of Corporate Law, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2008)
(“Manager choice results in the exclusion of other stakeholder interests from corporate law itself—
protection of these interests therefore defaults to market forces and external legal regimes.”); Pollman,
supra note 3, at 651 (noting that corporate law is “focused on the relationship among shareholders
and between shareholders and managers” and not “other participants, such as employees and
creditors”).
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This was not always the case. The aggregation of power made possible
by the corporate form has long engendered public concern and mistrust.139
Initially states attempted to control the power of corporations using
corporate law.140 At the founding, corporations were available only by
petition to the state legislature and required the corporation to declare a
limited corporate purpose.141 By the early 1800s, states had begun to enact
general incorporation statutes that allowed for incorporation without
petitioning the legislature, and they were widespread by the 1860s.142
These statutes were not “liberal incorporation statutes” as we would think
of them today; they were not available in all industries, and state
legislatures retained the right “to change or revoke corporate charters at
will.”143 In addition, several states still maintained restrictions on
capitalization and purpose.144 Further, during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the ultra vires doctrine provided “a meaningful way
to limit the power and size of corporations,” by limiting “the authority of
corporations to the purposes and activities named in the corporate
charter.”145
Once the first states enacted what would now be characterized as liberal
incorporation statutes in the early 1900s, corporations fled to those
states.146 In reaction to the loss of tax revenue, all states eventually enacted

139. See Donald J. Smythe, The Rise of the Corporation, the Birth of Public Relations, and the
Foundations of Modern Political Economy, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 635 (2011) (detailing the long history
of public concerns regarding corporations and the response of the business community to improve the
corporate image); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Logan (Nov. 12, 1816), in 10 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 521–22 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2013) (“I hope we shall take warning from
the example and crush in it’s [sic] birth the aristocracy of our monied corporations which dare already
to challenge our government to a trial of strength, and to bid defiance to the laws of their country.”).
140. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 646 (noting that “[u]ntil the late nineteenth century, state
corporate law served as a constraining force on corporate behavior”); Harwell Wells, The Life (and
Death?) of Corporate Waste, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1239, 1244 (2017) (describing nineteenthcentury methods of corporate control, including the ultra vires doctrine).
141. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 646–47; Strine & Walter, supra note 130, at 897
(“[C]orporations could do only what their legislatively granted charters empowered them specifically
to do, acts incidental to those specific powers and nothing else.”).
142. See Strine & Walter, supra note 130, at 908 (providing historical background on general
incorporation statutes).
143. Id.
144. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 649; Strine & Walter, supra note 130, at 909.
145. Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with Notes
on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1283
(2001) (providing a thorough history of the rise, fall, and potential reemergence of the ultra vires
doctrine).
146. See Cary, supra note 134, at 663–64. New Jersey was the first to adopt a liberal corporation
statute, followed by Delaware shortly thereafter. When New Jersey tightened its corporation statute at
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liberal incorporation statutes,147 allowing corporations to charter for “any
lawful business or purpose whatever.”148 This move was made to give
management the ability to “move freely into new business lines and out
of old ones,” and was not viewed as undermining the for-profit nature of
the corporation.149 Thus state corporate law evolved from a tool to cabin
the negative externalities of the corporate form to a permissive framework
for private ordering within the corporation.150
Despite the trend towards liberal incorporation, states have not ignored
the potential harms that can be inflicted by the ability to aggregate wealth
in the corporate form. These dangers have been largely addressed,
however, not as a matter of state corporate law, but rather in terms of
external regulation to protect parties outside the corporate control
structure.151 Examples of such regulations are abundant, including
regulations designed to protect employees, customers, and the
environment.152 States also enacted laws attempting to limit the political
power of corporations in state elections, though corporate speech rights
have now abolished that constraint on corporate power.153
While states have traditionally relied on external regulation to control
corporations that operate within their state, existing state corporate law
does not entirely ignore the potential for harm to third parties. Where
states have created the most mandatory rules for corporate insiders is
the behest of then-Governor Woodrow Wilson, Delaware took the lead in the race for corporations and
remains the leading state for incorporation. Id. at 664–65; Strine & Walter, supra note 130, at 923.
147. See Greenfield, supra note 145, at 1311 (noting that competition among the states leads to
liberal incorporation statutes).
148. See Strine & Walter, supra note 130 (quoting WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON STOCK AND
STOCKHOLDERS, BONDS, MORTGAGES, AND GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 1604 (3d ed. 1984)).
149. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the
Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 784, 784 n.90 (2015); see Greenfield, supra note 145, at 1313 (noting
that the profit maximization rule largely replaced the ultra vires doctrine).
150. See Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 356 (“Instead of entrusting corporate managers whose
ultimate right to office depends solely upon election by stockholders to protect other constituencies
and society from externality risk, conservative corporate theory looks to the political process as the
legitimate and sound form of protection.”); Pollman, supra note 3, at 654–55 (“The law settled on a
system in which corporate law governed the internal structure of the corporation and laws outside of
corporate law provided the primary check on corporate activity.”).
151. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 655 (describing the “widely acknowledged” division between
corporate law and “external legal regimes”).
152. See Kent Greenfield, Proposition: Saving the World with Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 948,
951 (2008) (noting that interests outside the power structure of the corporation “are left to depend
primarily on ‘external’ regulations, such as minimum-wage laws, environmental regulations, and
consumer safety rules” for protection).
153. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 615–16; supra Section I.A.1 (discussing corporate speech rights).
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when the rights of third parties and minority shareholders are affected.154
For example, all states require corporations to use an entity name that puts
the public on notice of the corporation’s limited liability status.155 Perhaps
most importantly, the equitable doctrine of veil piercing was developed
by state courts to protect corporate creditors from abuses of the privilege
of limited liability.156
B.

The Creeping Federalization of State Corporate Law

There is a growing body of scholarship detailing the ways in which
speech and religious rights for corporations have put pressure on state
corporate law, potentially upsetting the balance between states and their
corporate creations.157 The Roberts Court has put pressure on state
corporate law in two related ways: first, by requiring state law to flesh out
and implement these new rights and, second, by using (or, arguably,
misusing) principles of state corporate law to support its holdings. This
combination makes it clear that states will necessarily play a role in
defining the rights of corporations, but leaves it unclear which, if any, of
the Court’s declarations about the nature of state corporate law are
constitutionally or statutorily mandated. The lack of clarity has the
potential to lead to a creeping federalization of state corporate law as the
Supreme Court preempts by implication.
The U.S. Supreme Court has a long history of granting rights to
corporations.158 Early cases giving corporations equal protection and due
process rights in the context of protecting corporate property solidified the
legal personality of corporations to enter into contracts and protect the

154. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Facilitative and Mandatory Rules in the Corporation Law(s) of the
United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 252–53 (2002) (describing mandatory rules to protect third
parties and non-controlling shareholders).
155. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 202 (West 2019) (requiring “corporation,” “incorporated,” or
“limited” to appear in corporation’s name); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(1) (2017) (requiring a
name indicating limited liability status such as “corporation” or “incorporated” unless the corporation
certifies it has more than $10 million in assets).
156. See infra Section III.A.
157. See Buccola, supra note 5; Pollman, supra note 3; David Rosenberg, The Corporate Paradox
of Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 308 (2017) (noting the tension
between the Hobby Lobby decision and corporate law); Strine & Walter, supra note 4. These rights
have also created tension with aspects of federal law. See Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with
Responsibilities: Personal Jurisdiction in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
125 (2013) (describing tension between corporate rights and personal jurisdiction).
158. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95,
99 (2014) (detailing history of corporate constitutional rights); Pollman, supra note 3, at 658–64.
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property interests of shareholders.159 These rights were in line with
important principles of corporate law, such as maintaining the corporation
as a separate entity, without needing to “rely upon or significantly impact
state corporate law.”160
This changed as the Court expanded corporate speech rights into
speech not necessary to protect corporate property.161 In First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,162 the Court gave corporations the right to make
political expenditures on ballot measures.163 For the first time, the Court
implicated the internal control mechanisms of the corporation in its
holding, stating that the “shareholders may decide, through the procedures
of corporate democracy, whether their corporation should engage in
debate on public issues.”164 The Court pointed to the power to elect
directors and the ability to bring derivative suits for claims of corporate
waste as the “procedures” that shareholders can use to guide corporate
decision-making.165
The Bellotti holding was cabined to ballot measures until the Court
revived it in Citizens United, creating a seismic shift in corporate rights
doctrine.166 In Citizens United, the Court held that the corporation as an
association of individuals has the right to speak via campaign
expenditures from the corporation’s general treasury funds.167 The right
to speak was firmly grounded in the corporation, with the “procedures of
corporate democracy” once again tapped as the mechanism for
determining who speaks for the corporation.168 But, as scholars have
noted, corporate law was designed to “allow for private ordering of
business ventures,” not to “facilitate the political expression of corporate

159. Pollman, supra note 3, at 658–60 (“Legal personality established by corporate law served the
important function of providing for a separation of assets and locked in capital that allowed
corporations to serve as lasting institutions over time.”).
160. Id. at 660.
161. See id. at 661–62.
162. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
163. Id. at 776–78.
164. Id. at 794.
165. Id. at 794–95; see Pollman, supra note 3, at 664 (describing the origination of corporate law
interference in Bellotti). The ability for shareholders to participate in “corporate democracy” are
largely illusionary in the modern corporation, however, given the prevalence of stock ownership
through intermediaries. See Strine, supra note 2, at 443–44.
166. See Pollman, supra note 3, at 664–65; Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 363.
167. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 318–319 (2010).
168. Id. at 361–62 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794); see also Hardee, supra note 46, at 768–69.
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participants.”169 The opinion thus places strain on state corporate law to
assume a quasi-constitutional role that is a poor fit.170
The Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby exacerbated this problem. The
Court granted the shareholders of certain corporations the statutory right
under RFRA to exercise their personal religion via the corporation.171 In
doing so, the Court’s opinion repeatedly runs up against state corporate
law. Like Citizens United, the Hobby Lobby opinion relies on state law to
flesh out the contours of this new right. In response to the problem of
minority shareholders who might disagree with the corporation’s religious
choice, the Court assigns state corporate law the task of working out any
such disagreements.172
The Hobby Lobby decision went a step further by not only turning to
state law to flesh out corporate rights, but also relying on its own
controversial definitions of state corporate law to support its holding. The
most obvious example is the majority’s statement that state corporate law
does not require corporations to act solely in the pursuit of profit.173 The
Court’s statement regarding corporate purpose was not mere dicta; it is
essential to its holding that shareholders may wield the corporate form to
further any purpose they choose, including exercising their personal
religion.174 The question of corporate purpose is one that has been, and
continues to be, vigorously debated by corporate law scholars and state
courts.175 The Court did not acknowledge this debate with its sweeping
pronouncement, but rather characterized its finding as settled state law
across all jurisdictions.176 The goal of this Part is not to settle the debate
169. Pollman, supra note 3, at 667; see also Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 364 (arguing that
corporate law was designed to allow disinterested shareholders to make profits rather than to express
shareholders’ “diverse moral and political beliefs”).
170. Pollman, supra note 3, at 665.
171. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014); Hardee, supra
note 44, at 771–73 (describing holding in detail); Gregory A. Mark, Hobby Lobby and Corporate
Personhood: Taking the U.S. Supreme Court’s Reasoning at Face Value, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 535,
541 (2016) (noting that the decision protects the shareholders’ right to exercise religion).
172. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774–75. Corporate law does not present an easy answer. See infra
notes 188–193 and accompanying text.
173. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771 (“While it is certainly true that a central objective of forprofit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations
to pursue profit at the expense of everything else.”).
174. Id. (“If for-profit corporations may pursue [non-monetary social] objectives, there is no
apparent reason why they may not further religious objectives as well.”).
175. See supra Section I.B.
176. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771. The Court’s language regarding corporate purpose can be
read narrowly as limited only to circumstances where all shareholders of a closely held corporation
are in agreement to put aside profit in favor of a religious purpose. See id. (stating that corporations
can pursue other purposes “[s]o long as its owners agree” and “with ownership approval”);
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regarding corporate purpose for all fifty states, or to suggest that all
jurisdictions would even come to the same conclusion, but rather to note
where the Court’s reasoning runs into conflict with some views of existing
state laws regarding corporate purpose. This conflict indicates that at least
some states may wish to challenge the Court’s assertion of corporate
purpose.177
The Court points to inconclusive evidence to challenge the idea of
profit maximization. The fact that many companies exceed environmental
standards or make charitable donations fits comfortably within the view
of either conservative corporate theory or CSR, so long as the board can
justify them as beneficial to the long-term financial interests of
shareholders.178 The Court also references the trend toward enacting
statutes for the creation of benefit corporations—corporations with mixed
profit and socially beneficial purposes—as evidence that states allow
socially conscious corporations.179 The reference is somewhat puzzling as
the existence of a separate incorporation statute for corporations with a
mixed purpose suggests that general incorporation statutes do not provide
that option.180
In addition, benefit corporation statutes require benefit corporations to
place a social purpose above shareholders’ financial interests.181 These are
McDonnell, supra note 37, at 805 (noting that the Court’s language might suggest the “weaker
conception” of stakeholder involvement where shareholder approval is required). Given that there is
no cause for litigation when shareholders agree, there is scant evidence of what states consider to be
the limits of corporate purpose in such circumstances.
177. For example, Chief Justice Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court has argued forcefully that
the purpose of Delaware for-profit corporations is shareholder profit maximization. See Strine, supra
note 2, at 440–41; Strine, supra note 4, at 107–08; Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 346–51.
178. See supra notes 107–110 and accompanying text. By allowing shareholders to put their
personal interests above the interests of other stakeholders, such as employees, the Hobby Lobby
decision is arguably not in line with CSR. See supra notes 111–112.
179. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
180. See Strine, supra note 4, at 107. In addition, none of the corporations at issue are incorporated
under a benefit corporation statute. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764 (“Conestoga is organized
under Pennsylvania law as a for-profit corporation.”); id. at 2765 (noting that both Hobby Lobby and
Mardel are for-profit corporations under Oklahoma law).
181. See FLETCHER CYC., supra note 125, § 70.50 (“A benefit corporation (B corporation) is a new
class of corporation that uses the corporate form to solve social and environmental problems. . . . It’s
[sic] purpose is to create a positive impact on society and the environment, even if it sacrifices profit
to do so.”). California’s Benefit Corporation statute provides that “[a] benefit corporation shall have
the purpose of creating general public benefit.” CAL. CORP. CODE § 14610 (West 2019). “General
public benefit” is defined as “a material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a
whole, as assessed against a third-party standard.” Id. § 14601(c). Specific benefits may be defined
in the charter, including benefits to third parties such as providing low-income services or
“[p]romoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge,” with a catch-all category for “[t]he
accomplishment of any other particular benefit for society or the environment.” Id. § 14601(e).

10 - Hardee.docx (Do Not Delete)

248

3/25/2019 8:36 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:217

similar to constituency statutes, which specifically allow for-profit
corporations incorporated under general incorporation statutes to consider
non-shareholder interests in making corporate decisions.182 Both can be
interpreted as undercutting the shareholder maximization principle by
requiring or permitting corporations to place the interests of nonshareholders over shareholder profit.183 The fact that states are willing to
allow shareholders to use the corporate form to benefit third parties over
personal profit does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the
corporate form provides more leeway to shareholders to use the corporate
form to further their own personal interests at the expense of third
parties.184
The benefit corporation and constituency statutes demonstrate the
difficulty with the Court’s statement regarding corporate purpose. It is one
thing to say that corporations may (or must) consider the interests of
people other than shareholders when wielding the power of the corporate
form. Such a statement is in line with concerns that self-interested
shareholders will lead to the power of the corporate form being used to
the detriment of those outside the corporate power structure.185 It is
another thing to argue that states allow those within the corporate power
structure to wield the benefits of incorporation for any personal ends they
choose, even at the expense of other stakeholders. Such an argument
broadens, rather than limits, the ability of shareholders to use the
182. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L.
REV. 971, 986 (1992) (defining the basic model of non-shareholder constituency statutes as providing
“that in discharging their duty of care, directors may consider the effects of a decision on not only
shareholders, but also on a list of other constituency groups”). Unlike benefit corporations, which were
created to advance CSR, constituency statutes arose as anti-takeover protection for management. Id.
183. See Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the
Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 634 (2007) (“[S]hareholder constituency statutes have opened the door to
allow directors of public companies to take non-shareholder interests and concerns into consideration
when making investment decisions.”); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social
Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 25 (2012)
(noting that benefit corporations attack the shareholder wealth maximization principle while also
noting they allow management more discretion than constituency statutes).
184. See Murray, supra note 183, at 28 (arguing that guidance and oversight is necessary to avoid
having directors of benefit corporations to “default to seeking their own self-interest or their own
objectives”); Pollman, Corporate Law, supra note 87, at 170.
185. See Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on
Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the Benefit
Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 642 (2013) (noting the increased call for socially
conscious corporations who “consider stakeholder interests and embrace socially and
environmentally responsible business models” over shareholder wealth maximization); Daniel J.
Morrissey, The Riddle of Shareholder Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility, 80 BROOK. L. REV.
353, 387 (2015) (same).
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corporate form in their own self-interest.186 It is questionable whether
states intended the benefits of the corporate form, especially limited
liability, to be used by shareholders for their purely personal, noneconomic, ends.187
The denouncement of the shareholder maximization principle is also
problematic in relation to the Court’s tasking of state corporate law to
determine the rights of minority shareholders in determining the
corporation’s religion.188 The opinion states that in resolving disputes
regarding the corporation’s religion, courts should look to the
corporation’s management structure and “underlying state law in
resolving disputes.”189 In resolving intracorporate disputes, however,
states have relied on the profit maximization principle to settle conflicts
between shareholders when a majority shareholder wishes to put a
personal or social goal over profits.190 When the majority shareholder
professes to be seeking to further some other goal at the expense of profits,
states have stepped in to protect the minority shareholder based on the
grounds that in taking the corporate form, controlling shareholders have a
duty to put the corporate profit ahead of other interests.191
The Hobby Lobby opinion thus creates a paradox. If a majority
shareholder states that she is claiming a RFRA exemption to maximize
the profits of the corporation, she does not violate state corporate law and
the minority shareholder has no claim against her. But in alleging a profit
motive, she has disqualified herself from claiming a religious exemption,
186. See Mohapatra, supra note 76, at 180–81 (noting that contraceptive mandate was
determination by Congress that socially responsible corporations must provide contraceptive
coverage and Hobby Lobby allowed shareholders’ personal beliefs to nullify that right); Pollman,
Corporate Law, supra note 87, at 170.
187. The veil piercing doctrine generally makes limited liability unavailable to shareholders who
use the corporation’s assets for their own personal use. See infra Section III.A.
188. The fact that the Court recognized the possibility that there could be conflict over the decision
to claim a RFRA exemption suggests that its rejection of the shareholder maximization principle is
not limited to only corporations where shareholders unanimously agree to adopt a corporate religion.
189. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014).
190. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding
controlling shareholders cannot put social goals over profit for minority shareholder in a for profit
corporation); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (same); see also D. Gordon
Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 318–21 (1998) (demonstrating that the
shareholder primacy norm arose out of minority oppression cases). Professor Smith argues that the
shareholder primacy norm is largely irrelevant under modern law and such issues should be
considered under the doctrine of minority oppression. Id. at 322–23. He notes that whether a change
in doctrine will lead to different outcomes is up for debate. Id. at 321.
191. See Newmark, 16 A.3d at 34 (“The corporate form in which craigslist operates, however, is
not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders
interested in realizing a return on their investment.”).
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as the Hobby Lobby decision makes it clear that any exemption must be
motivated by the sincere religious beliefs of the shareholders.192 If, on the
other hand, the majority shareholder claims that the exemption is
motivated by her sincere religious belief and not profit, then she is
permitted to claim the RFRA exemption but may run afoul of state
corporate law, possibly giving the minority shareholder a claim against
her.193
The Court’s holding in Hobby Lobby also conflicts with the separation
required between the corporation and its shareholders. Legal separation
between shareholders and the corporation is the foundational principle of
corporate law.194 The legal existence of the corporation, distinct from its
shareholders, forms the basis for the benefits that flow from entity status,
such as perpetual life, the ability to contract in the corporation’s name,
and, most importantly, limited liability for shareholders.195 The Court’s
opinion breaks down this separation by looking through the corporate
entity to reach the personal rights of the shareholders.196 Corporations
qualify for a RFRA exemption only if the corporation’s shareholders can
claim a unity of interest with the corporation such that their personal
religious beliefs can infuse the corporation with their religion.197
192. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774 (basing its decision on the sincerity of the shareholders’
religious beliefs).
193. See Robert M. Ackerman & Lance Cole, Making Corporate Law More Communitarian: A
Proposed Response to the Roberts Court’s Personification of Corporations, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 895,
962–63 (2016) (arguing that it is “hard to imagine” that RFRA would allow a controlling shareholder
to elevate their personal religious beliefs over the rights of the minority shareholders “in contravention
of the controlling shareholders’ fiduciary obligations”). The Hobby Lobby opinion can thus only be
reconciled with all states’ corporate law if the Court’s language regarding corporate purpose is taken
to mean that corporations with unanimous shareholder agreement may claim any shareholder purpose,
but shareholders who are not in agreement are limited to solely profit motives. As noted, the accuracy
of allowing expanded shareholder purposes, even with unanimity, is not without doubt under state
law. See supra Section II.B.
194. See KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY SHOULD ACT LIKE IT)
10 (2018) (“[I]t is not an overstatement to say that corporate separateness has been one of the most
important legal innovations in the development of national wealth.”); Elizabeth Pollman,
Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1638–39; Sepper, Contraception,
supra note 67, at 318 (“The very goal of the corporate form is to separate the person from the entity,
shielding the person from obligation and liability and ensuring that the entity focuses on profit
maximization.”).
195. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at
14, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL
333889, at *6–10 [hereinafter Corporate Law Professors’ Brief]; Greenfield, supra note 145, at 314.
196. The Court held that “[a] corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings to
achieve desired ends” and that “protecting the free-exercise rights of corporations . . . protects the
religious liberty of the humans who own and control those companies.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
197. Id. at 2774 (limiting holding to companies where owners share sincere religious beliefs).
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Numerous scholars have argued that such a holding violates basic
principles of state corporate law.198
In light of these U.S. Supreme Court decisions, states are faced with
several unanswered questions that threaten to undermine the principles of
federalism that have been the hallmark of state corporate law. While it is
clear that state law must flesh out corporate rights, must they do so in a
way that furthers the corporate right at issue?199 Other questions are raised
regarding the Court’s use of controversial descriptions of state corporate
law: are states required to utilize the Court’s definition, even if
corporations are not constituted in such a way under their law? Even if the
Court accurately characterized state law as it existed at the time of the
decision, do states retain their historic power to alter corporate law to
adapt to new circumstances?200 These questions speak to the heart of a
state’s power to define the acceptable uses of the corporate form.
In responding to these questions, states will be faced with policy
decisions regarding the balance of power within a corporation that take on
new import given the now quasi-constitutional implications of corporate
governance. State corporate law was designed to provide flexibility to
corporate insiders, not to protect the ability of shareholders to exercise
their constitutional rights through the corporation.201 Likewise, protecting
the rights of third parties and the integrity of the political system was taken
out of the ambit of corporate governance and largely entrusted to external
regulation.202 If such regulations are no longer constitutionally permitted,
states must find new ways (or return to their old ways) to contend with the
unleashed power of the corporate form.

198. Before the Court’s decision, corporate scholars urged the Court to reject an alter ego view of
the corporation that would weaken the separation requirement. See Corporate Law Professors’ Brief,
supra note 195 (arguing against allowing RFRA exemptions on corporate law grounds); Greenfield,
supra note 145, at 1313–14; Sepper, Contraception, supra note 67, at 318–19. After the Court’s
decision, many prominent corporate scholars have decried the decision as fundamentally at odds with
the principle of a separate corporate entity. See Ackerman & Cole, supra note 193, at 948; Mark,
supra note 171, at 540; Pollman, Corporate Law, supra note 87, at 157; Thomas E. Rutledge, A
Corporation Has No Soul—the Business Entity Law Response to Challenges to the PPACA
Contraceptive Mandate, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2014).
199. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 3, at 686–87 (discussing open questions regarding application
of corporate religious rights).
200. See, e.g., Buccola, supra note 5, at 621–22 (exploring whether states may change status quo
to adapt to corporate speech rights).
201. See supra Section II.A.
202. See supra Section II.A.
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Pushing Back, but with Caution

Given the shift in the foundation of state corporate law created by
granting corporations personal rights, states may decide that some
reconceptualization of the architecture of corporate law is in order.203
Because the Court has been unclear about what areas of state law it is
preempting, however, it is difficult to know how much states can push
back.204 For constitutional law scholars, these issues may appear clear cut.
When the Constitution gives a right to a natural born person, it is
axiomatic that the state cannot try to redefine what it means to be a
“person.”205 Corporations, however, are different.206
What a corporation is is not a matter of natural law or biology; it
necessarily depends on how a corporation is defined by the state.207 A state
may create corporations that lack the power to engage in certain
behaviors, even if those behaviors arguably implicate constitutional
rights.208 Historically this line was policed more vigorously by the states
with limited corporate purposes, the ultra vires doctrine, and stricter
requirements regarding corporate structure.209 While the trend has been to
provide shareholders and management more leeway in terms of corporate
purpose and structure, that is not a requirement.210

203. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 599 (arguing that although “states cannot overrule the Court’s
understanding of corporate rights” they can “disempower the corporations they create from doing the
kinds of things that implicate disfavored federal rights”).
204. See id. at 616–17 (noting that the Court’s corporate speech cases create uncertainty regarding
whether states retain “their historical authority over domestic corporations”).
205. Id. at 600 (noting that most rights cases involve questions of individuals who undoubtedly
have the “power to act contrary to the regulation”).
206. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 16, at 86 (“A corporation, after all, is not a natural,
Platonic entity. It is a legal arrangement, and its internal allocation of authority is a product of legal
rules.”); Buccola, supra note 5, at 600 (describing corporations as requiring positive law to establish
their capacities to act).
207. This is meant in the weak sense that whether a corporation has the power to engage in an
activity or what procedures are required by corporate governance law to authorize certain activities is
a matter of state law. It is not meant to state a position in the debate over corporate personhood and
the epistemological nature of a corporation.
208. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 599. Professor Buccola gives the “trivial yet telling example”
that Delaware law forbids the issuing of “honorary degrees” by corporations without approval by the
Secretary of Education. Id. It is likely that individuals would have a protected First Amendment right
to express approval of someone by conferring such an honor, while it seems unlikely that the First
Amendment would require that corporations be empowered to do so. Id.
209. See supra notes 139–145 and accompanying text.
210. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 610 (finding that the states did not lose their authority to limit
corporate power, “they simply ceased to exercise it”).
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Corporate purpose and structure can be dictated in myriad ways,
including by requiring other stakeholders or members of the broader
community to have a binding say in corporate governance.211 The Court
implicitly recognized this fact by acknowledging that state corporate law
will determine how corporate rights can be exercised.212 It remains an
open question, however, whether states must respond in a way that merely
incorporates these new rights into the existing rules regarding
corporations or whether states retain the power to rethink the rules in light
of the new weight put on corporate governance.
Scholars are beginning to suggest ways that states can adapt corporate
law in light of these new rights.213 For example, in Citizens United, the
Court noted that the “procedures of corporate democracy” determine who
speaks for the corporation.214 Traditionally, the board of directors makes
such decisions about the management of the corporation, including
corporate expenditures, without shareholder approval.215 Scholars have
suggested that states could create a requirement that shareholders be given

211. For example, in Germany employees make up half of the supervisory board, leading to true
codetermination by statutory mandate. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory
Management: An Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1054 (1998) (comparing
American and German efforts at participatory management). German boards also often include
representatives of banks or other businesses who represent a constituency with a relationship to the
company. Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 99
(2007). California became the first state to attempt such corporate engineering by enacting a law
requiring any corporation headquartered in the state to have a minimum amount of gender diversity.
See Sophia Bollag, California Just Became the First State to Require Women on Corporate Boards.
Here’s What You Need to Know, MONEY (Oct. 1, 2018), http://time.com/money/5411416/californiawomen-corporate-boards/ [https://perma.cc/MGT8-D3W7].
212. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (“State
corporate law provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts [about the corporation’s religion]
by, for example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing structure.”); Citizens United
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010) (noting that the “procedures of corporate democracy” will
determine corporate speech).
213. See, e.g., Ackerman & Cole, supra note 193 (making statutory proposals to curb the effects of
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby); Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 16 (outlining proposals to give
shareholders a role in the decision to make political expenditures); Buccola, supra note 5 (outlining
the power of states to define corporate law despite the Court’s incursions). While not directly making
a state law proposal, Professor Bodie argues that a corporation should only have a right to exercise
religion if the employees have a say in its adoption. See Bodie, supra note 112, at 618–21.
214. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361–62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 794 (1978)).
215. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 16, at 87 (describing corporate governance rules relating
to the decision to engage in political speech); Rosenberg, supra note 157, at 312 (noting that under
existing corporate law, the decision to spend money is an everyday business decision and thus under
the power of the board).
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a say on corporate political expenditures.216 As a practical matter,
shareholder votes are expensive and would draw attention to any
campaign spending, thus voting requirements would likely hamper the
exercise of political speech by corporations.217
Although states should seek to rebalance the power corporations can
exert within their territory, it is important not to throw the proverbial baby
out with the bathwater. The genius of the modern corporation is the
enabling of private ordering to achieve economic efficiencies. Dramatic
changes to that system could lead to unintended consequences. The
prospect of corporate flight raises another limitation to proposals
regarding state corporate law: the internal affairs doctrine.218 For a
proposal to actually protect its citizens, a state would need to disregard
the internal affairs doctrine and apply their own law to foreign
corporations.219 Disregarding the internal affairs doctrine, especially for
core internal governance issues like shareholder voting, raises
constitutional concerns of its own.220 Perhaps more importantly, it leads
to practical problems as corporations may be subject to inconsistent
governance requirements from multiple states.221
This Article suggests that while states should push back, the best
response—at least initially—may be a tentative one.222 States should turn
to the courts to enforce those aspects of corporate common law that
provide balance between corporate power and its impact on third parties.
Utilizing an existing common law doctrine already in service of protecting
parties outside the corporation from the state-sanctioned power of the

216. See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 16 (outlining proposals to give shareholders a role in the
decision to make political expenditures); Taub, supra note 89, at 426–27 (proposing limiting
corporate speech rights to only those corporations that qualify for the Hobby Lobby exemptions,
including shareholder agreement).
217. See Greenwood, supra note 46, at 1037 (noting that shareholder elections are “enormously
expensive” but are largely predetermined in favor of management).
218. See supra Section II.A.
219. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 635–36. Professor Buccola also notes that host states can protect
their citizens by refusing to recognize corporations chartered in other states if they do not meet the
requirements of the host state. Id. at 644.
220. See id. at 638–40 (describing the debate over whether the internal affairs doctrine is
constitutionally mandated).
221. Despite this concern, both California and New York have passed outreach statutes that
regulate at least some of the internal affairs of corporations with strong ties to the state. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 2115 (West 2019); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1301–20 (McKinney 2018).
222. Depending on the response from the federal bench to initial attempts to modify existing state
law, a dramatic rethinking of corporate law may be required, but it is not clear that such revolutionary
action is necessary yet. Cf. Ackerman & Cole, supra note 193, at 1000–01 (arguing for mandatory
constituency statutes that would adopt a communitarian model of the corporation).
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corporation would make a good start. An ideal candidate would involve
parties outside the corporation to provide the strongest basis for
disregarding the internal affairs doctrine. The doctrine of veil piercing
provides just such a test case. While utilizing the veil piercing doctrine in
such a way is not without its challenges, at the very least it will force the
Court to be transparent about the lengths to which it intends to federalize
state corporate law in the name of corporate rights.
III. RETHINKING LIMITED LIABILITY AND VEIL PIERCING
The protection of shareholders’ personal assets from corporate debts is
a hallmark of the corporate form. But limited liability is not unlimited.
Courts will pierce the corporate veil to allow creditors to reach
shareholders’ personal assets in cases where the shareholder has abused
the corporate form or used the corporation for personal ends.223 The
Supreme Court’s corporate rights decisions implicate both the separation
requirement and corporate purpose, making adaptations to the veil
piercing doctrine a doctrinally justifiable response. While there will likely
be pushback against state attempts to minimize the impact of corporate
rights, there are several practical reasons why changes to the veil piercing
doctrine enacted through the common law puts states in the best position
to respond to challenges.
A.

Limited Liability and Veil Piercing

Limited liability is generally regarded as the most important benefit
provided by the corporate form.224 Limited liability prevents creditors
from reaching the personal assets of corporate shareholders to pay the
debts of the corporation unless the shareholder is personally liable for the
debt.225 Shareholders are only liable for debts that they personally

223. See Carol Goforth, A Corporation Has No Soul, and Doesn’t Go to Church: Relating the
Doctrine of Piercing the Veil to Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 67 S.C. L. REV. 73, 86–87 (2015).
224. See Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 195, at 6; Daniel J. Morrissey, Piercing All
the Veils: Applying an Established Doctrine to a New Business Order, 32 J. CORP. L. 529, 536 (2007)
(“Limited liability is considered the most important aspect of a corporation . . . .”).
225. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(6) (2017) (providing that “the stockholders of a
corporation shall not be personally liable for the payment of the corporation’s debts except as they
may be liable by reason of their own conduct or acts”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2016) (“A shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for any liabilities of the
corporation (including liabilities arising from acts of the corporation) except (i) to the extent provided
in a provision of the articles of incorporation permitted by section 2.02(b)(2)(v), and (ii) that a
shareholder may become personally liable by reason of the shareholder’s own acts or conduct.”); see
also Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE
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guarantee or for torts that they commit in their personal capacity.226 This
allows the corporation to incur sizeable liability in both contract and tort
while shareholders “only stand to lose their initial investments in the
business. The rest of their personal assets will be safe.”227
Limited liability is a radical departure from the traditional forms of
business—general partnerships and sole proprietorships—that were used
for nearly all business prior to the end of the nineteenth century.228 Under
such forms, business owners were treated as having a unity of identity
with their business and thus were personally responsible for the debts of
the business.229 Personal liability was justified on the grounds that
business owners reaped the profits of the business enterprise and generally
exercised control over the business and therefore should be held liable for
its debts.230
Numerous justifications have been offered in support of altering this
baseline rule that those who profit from a business are responsible for its
debts.231 First and foremost, limited liability is justified on the grounds
that, unlike general partnerships or sole proprietorships, a corporation has
FOREST L. REV. 1, 8 (1997) (“All state corporate statutes provide shareholders limited liability either
explicitly or implicitly.”).
226. See Morrissey, supra note 224, at 536; Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability:
Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 10 (1994) (noting direct liability for “tort, crime, or regulatory actions” taken by shareholders
in their personal capacity).
227. Morrissey, supra note 224, at 537.
228. See Hardee, supra note 44, at 12–13 (describing history of unincorporated forms); Gregory A.
Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1441, 1443–44 (1987); Thompson, supra note 226, at 9 (noting that limited liability did not
become the standard until the middle of the nineteenth century).
229. See Hardee, supra note 44, at 11–12 (describing relationship between partners and sole
proprietors and their business entities); Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate Dispute: Conceptualism
and Functionalism in Partnership Law, 42 ARK. L. REV. 395, 396–97 (describing partnerships as
people conducting business with “jointly owned property and jointly incurred obligations”).
230. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close Corporations Reconsidered, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1171
(1989) (comparing closely held corporations with active shareholders and general partnerships,
concluding that “the issue of control is crucial in determining the appropriateness and legitimacy of
limited liability”); Morrissey, supra note 224, at 536 (describing conceptual difference between
partnerships and corporations with respect to limited liability).
231. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93 (1985) (arguing that limited liability exists to “facilitate[] the corporate
form of organization” and lower transaction costs); Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand:
Feminist and Other Reflections on the Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV.
1387, 1394–95 (1992) (critiquing traditional justifications of limited liability through a feminist lens);
Mitchell, supra note 230, at 1147 (focusing on limited liability driven by judicial decisions and as a
result of separation of control and ownership). It would be impossible to cover all the proffered
justifications for limited liability in this Article and thus the focus is on the rationales that relate most
closely to veil piercing and corporate purpose as relates to corporate rights. See infra Section III.B.1.
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its own legal existence “separate and apart from its shareholders.”232 This
legal separation provides the conceptual basis for treating corporate debt
as distinct from personal debt.233 Separation is most cleanly observed in
corporations where shareholders are passive investors with little control,
making it “unfair to hold shareholders accountable for [corporate]
obligations.”234 However, shareholders are not required to remain passive
for limited liability to apply, so long as corporate debts are not a result of
their personal conduct.235
Strong economic rationales also support the concept of limited liability.
It is no coincidence that widespread limited liability in the corporate form
arose during the Industrial Revolution.236 In order to amass the capital
necessary for substantial building projects, investors needed a way to
invest without the burden of actively monitoring the management of each
entity to protect their personal assets.237 Limited liability provided the
solution. It allowed investors to diversify their holdings by removing the
threat of personal liability.238 It also democratized investment by giving
less wealthy individuals the ability to access the capital markets without

232. Morrissey, supra note 224, at 536; accord Gabaldon, supra note 231, at 1394–95 (discussing
the “perception that unlimited liability is the natural consequence of carrying on a business and limited
liability is a special benefit conferred in exchange for the expense and constraints of the corporate
format”); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 231, at 89 (arguing that under the nexus of
contract theory, limited liability exists because the corporation is not “real” and thus shareholders are
only liable for the amounts they invest).
233. See Gabaldon, supra note 231, at 1396 (noting that early American courts found limited
liability based on the “separate juridical stature of the corporation”).
234. Morrissey, supra note 224, at 537; see also Thompson, supra note 225, at 10 (noting that veil
piercing is very rarely successful against passive investors in a corporation).
235. See supra notes 225–226.
236. See Smythe, supra note 139, at 645 (describing the economic changes of the Second Industrial
Revolution that were facilitated by corporate law); Jeffrey K. Vandervoort, Piercing the Veil of
Limited Liability Companies: The Need for a Better Standard, 3 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 51, 53–
54 (2004) (describing limited liability as helping fuel the Industrial Revolution). But see Mitchell,
supra note 230, at 1165–67 (noting that the history of limited liability is “inconclusive” and that
limited liability may not have been a primary driver of industrialization).
237. See Morrissey, supra note 224, at 537–38 (stating that limited liability alleviates the need for
shareholders to avoid the need to actively monitor management); Smythe, supra note 139, at 645
(noting the increased capital needs of the Second Industrial Revolution). Limited liability thus allows
for efficient capital markets by relieving shareholders of the need to “assess[] the value of [their]
potential shares vis-à-vis those of every other stockholder.” Morrissey, supra note 224, at 539.
238. See Henry Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259,
262 (1967) (noting that personal liability would prevent diversification by wealthy investors);
Vandervoort, supra note 236, at 54 (“With limited liability, owners are set free to invest in various
business ventures without the need to incur the excessive costs necessary to monitor each enterprise
closely.”).
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shouldering monitoring costs.239 Such justifications do not necessarily
apply to closely held corporations, especially because creditors of small
corporations will frequently require debts to be personally guaranteed.240
However, limited liability arguably promotes entrepreneurship by
limiting the risk to small business owners’ personal assets.241
While there are many reasons why limited liability has flourished, it is
not without its costs. The risk of corporate debt is not magically whisked
away by the corporate form. Limited liability simply takes the economic
risk off the backs of entrepreneurs and investors and places it on creditors
and tort victims.242 Thus, corporate shareholders enjoy the profits of the
business enterprise while passing a significant share of its risks onto
others. Externalizing risks in such a way creates a moral hazard as
entrepreneurs are incentivized to take outsized risks because they do not
bear the full loss.243 Given these costs, limited liability can be seen as a
“trade-off” society makes in order to “encourage economic expansion.”244
Limited liability is not an absolute privilege, however. If shareholders
are found to have abused the corporate form, the doctrine of veil piercing
allows the court to “pierce” the limited liability shield of the corporation
to allow corporate creditors to recover from the shareholders’ personal
assets.245 Veil piercing is an equitable remedy developed under the
common law to avoid injustice created by limited liability.246 It occurs
239. See Stephen V. Presser, The Bogalusa Explosion, “Single Business Enterprise,” “Alter Ego,”
and Other Errors: Academics, Economics, Democracy, and Shareholder Limited Liability: Back
Towards a Unitary “Abuse” Theory of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 405, 408–
09 (2006) (stating that limited liability allowed diversification of the ownership of corporations, thus
spreading wealth among the community); Vandervoort, supra note 236, at 55 (noting that limited
liability allows those who cannot afford monitoring costs access to capital markets).
240. See Morrissey, supra note 224, at 540 (noting that limited liability for small companies may
make little difference for contract claims, but not for tort claims).
241. But see Mitchell, supra note 230, at 1172 (arguing that “limited liability makes little, if any,
difference in the decision of small businesspersons to incorporate”).
242. Morrissey, supra note 224, at 535; see also Gabaldon, supra note 231, at 1429 (“Limiting
liability is about imposing risks that someone else must bear.”).
243. See Morrissey, supra note 224, at 540 (noting limited liability in closely held corporations can
“allow the owners to unfairly externalize the costs of their enterprise”); Thompson, supra note 226,
at 14 (explaining that limited liability may create incentives to engage in hazardous activities or fail
to make safety investments).
244. See Morrissey, supra note 224, at 535. Limited liability is such a success that it has been
expanded into other forms, including the Limited Liability Company and the Limited Liability
Partnership. See Vandervoort, supra note 236, at 63–64.
245. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 1–12 (2018); Robert B. Thompson,
Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991).
246. See Morrissey, supra note 224, at 541 (noting that veil piercing is an equitable remedy
developed under the common law); Thompson, supra note 245, at 1041 (“Resolution of a piercing
question is almost always left to a judge’s determination of corporate illegitimacy.”); cf. Alexander
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when a court determines that the corporate shield ought to be disregarded,
or pierced, because “the debt in question is not really a debt of the
corporation, but ought, in fairness, to be viewed as a debt of the individual
or corporate shareholder or shareholders.”247 Courts are likely to pierce
when “the owners are using the business in such a way as to advance only
their personal interests rather than the corporation’s legal interests.”248
A noted scholar and empiricist found that “piercing the corporate veil
is the most litigated issue in corporate law.”249 Despite its prevalence,
scholars frequently bemoan the lack of uniformity and clarity in the
doctrine.250 The vagaries or, more charitably, the flexibility of veil
piercing cases may simply be a side effect of the “discretion necessarily
inherent in equitable jurisprudence,” or the ambiguity may be necessary
to prevent giving corporations a “road map for fraud.”251 A leading treatise
on veil piercing posits that “the doctrine is never likely to be pinned down
to rigid particulars, and that it will evolve and change as long as our
conception of, and our goals for, the corporation remain changing.” 252
Thus, “[a]s long as our theories of the corporation are changing,” the
doctrine will continue to evolve.253 Although the exact contours of veil
piercing are difficult to pin down, even critics of the doctrine concede that
the body of cases “may be understood, at least roughly, as attempts to
balance the benefits of limited liability against its costs.”254
While pinning down a definitive test across jurisdictions is impossible,
most veil piercing cases require a showing that a corporation was an “alter
ego” or “mere instrumentality” of the shareholder.255 Extensive empirical
v. Abbey of the Chimes, 163 Cal. Rptr. 377, 381 (Ct. App. 1980) (“When considering the application
of the alter ego doctrine to a particular situation, it must be remembered that it is an equitable doctrine
and, though courts have justified its application through consideration of many factors, their basic
motivation is to assure a just and equitable result.” (citation omitted)).
247. PRESSER, supra note 245, at 8 (citation omitted).
248. Goforth, supra note 223, at 86–87; see also Morrissey, supra note 224, at 544–46 (expressing
veil piercing at its essence as “courts seem to be saying, if you fail to act like a corporation . . . we
won’t afford your owners limited liability, which is the principle privilege of [the corporation’s]
artificial existence”).
249. Thompson, supra note 245, at 1036.
250. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 230, at 1169 (“The circumstances under which [veil piercing]
will occur are unclear; the tests that courts apply in deciding whether to disregard the corporate fiction
richly reflect judicial ambivalence.”); Morrissey, supra note 224, at 542 (noting that “the piercing
doctrine has been widely disparaged as a confusing anomaly”).
251. Morrissey, supra note 224, at 543.
252. PRESSER, supra note 245, at 12.
253. Id.
254. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 231, at 109.
255. Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81, 84 (2010).

10 - Hardee.docx (Do Not Delete)

260

3/25/2019 8:36 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:217

work has found a set of common factors that courts frequently consider
when determining whether the shareholder is an alter ego of the
corporation such as commingling of funds, control or domination by the
shareholder, fraud or misrepresentation, inadequate capitalization, and
injustice or unfairness.256 Commingling occurs when a shareholder fails
to maintain the corporation as a separate business unit by “us[ing]
corporate funds for personal purposes, mix[ing] corporate and personal
accounts, or commingl[ing] assets so that the ownership interests [are]
indistinguishable.”257 The factor of control or domination by the
shareholder requires more than just a shareholder who runs the
corporation and profits from it.258 Rather, it requires a showing that a
shareholder or shareholders so dominate the affairs of the corporation that
there is no separation between the two.259
Many states have incorporated these factors into a two-part test. For
example, California is typical in this approach where veil piercing
requires: “(1) that there be such unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist
and (2) that, if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, an
inequitable result will follow.”260 The ultimate question in the veil
piercing analysis is to determine whether maintaining the separate
256. John H. Matheson, Why Courts Pierce: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 7
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 32–36 (2010) (performing statistical analysis and finding the following factors
applied by courts in veil piercing cases: fraud/misrepresentation (49.2%), owner control/dominance
(48.6%), commingling of funds (38.1%), undercapitalization (32.6%), non-functioning leadership
(30.3%), overlap (28.7%), unfairness/injustice (28.5%), nonexistent leadership (22.1%), assumption
of risk (3.9%)); see also Oh, supra note 255, at 90 (“[Q]uite predictable suspects comprise the most
common instrumental rationales: commingling, control or domination, injustice or unfairness, fraud
or misrepresentation, and inadequate capitalization.”); Thompson, supra note 245, at 1044 (reporting
empirical work).
257. FLETCHER CYC., supra note 125, § 41.50 (Analysis of specific factors—Commingling of
assets); see, e.g., Macaluso v. Jenkins, 420 N.E.2d 251, 256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (finding commingling
of assets because shareholder gave corporate funds to another corporation, used corporate property
for the benefit of other corporations, and paid personal bills with corporate funds, including donations
to charitable causes).
258. FLETCHER CYC., supra note 125, § 41.10 (alter ego or mere instrumentality doctrine).
259. See, e.g., Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that piercing is
appropriate when a party has “such domination of a corporation as in reality to negate its separate
personality”).
260. Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 702 P.2d 601, 606 (Cal. 1985) (quoting Automotriz Del Golfo
De Cal. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1957)); see also FLETCHER CYC., supra note 125, § 41.30
(determinative factors in general) (noting the “two general elements required by most jurisdictions”
are such a “unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the
individual no longer exist [and], the circumstances must indicate that adherence to the fiction of
separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice”); PRESSER, supra note 245,
at 138 (referring to the Automotriz test as the “standard two-part test in use in many jurisdictions”).
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corporate identity in the circumstances would “defeat the rights and
equities of third persons.”261
B.

Claiming an Exemption Based on Unity of Interest with the
Corporation Should Factor into the Veil Piercing Analysis

Scholars have noted the logical fit between veil piercing and the
rationale behind religious exemption claims made by corporations.262
Even before Hobby Lobby was decided, a group of prominent corporate
scholars argued that religious exemptions for corporations raise veil
piercing issues because those exemptions rely on a sufficient unity of
interest between shareholder and corporation to allow the religious beliefs
of the individuals to carry over to the corporation.263 They argued the
petitioners in Hobby Lobby, in fact, were asking the Court to disregard the
corporate veil so that they could be treated as one and the same as their
corporations—a controversial practice referred to as reverse veil
piercing.264 The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the argument that
Congress intended that corporate law’s separation requirement should
deny shareholders the right to raise RFRA claims on behalf of themselves
and their corporations.265 Since the decision, scholars have urged reversal
on the grounds that the decision is inconsistent with the veil piercing
doctrine.266
The Court’s decision that Congress intended that shareholders be
allowed to use their corporation to exercise their personal religion does
not necessarily settle the question of how states may respond when

261. Mesler, 702 P.2d at 607 (quoting Kohn v. Kohn, 214 P.2d 71, 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)).
262. See, e.g., Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 195, at 7–8 (using veil piercing and
reverse veil piercing doctrine to argue against allowing RFRA exemption); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Using Reverse Veil Piercing to Vindicate the Free Exercise Rights of Incorporated Employers, 16
GREEN BAG 2d 235, 236–37 (2013) (arguing that reverse veil piercing provides the analytical
framework to disregard the corporate entity to allow shareholders to exercise religion through the
corporation); Goforth, supra note 223, at 97 (concluding that veil piercing doctrine is evidence that
the Hobby Lobby decision is incompatible with state corporate law); Mohapatra, supra note 76, at
169–75 (describing arguments relating to veil piercing for and against allowing corporate religious
claims).
263. See Corporate Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 195, at 6.
264. See id. at 16–18; Bainbridge, supra note 262, at 237 (arguing that reverse veil piercing
“provides the analytical framework currently missing” from the lower court cases granting
exemptions).
265. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014)
(“Congress provided protection for people like the Hahns and Greens by employing a familiar legal
fiction: It included corporations within RFRA’s definition of ‘persons.’”).
266. See generally Goforth, supra note 223; see also Mohapatra, supra note 76, at 169–75.
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shareholders do.267 Corporate law professors from the University of
California Berkeley raised this point to the Department of Health and
Human Services in a comment on the definition of “eligible organization”
for purposes of claiming a Hobby Lobby exemption.268 They argued that
to qualify for a RFRA exemption, “shareholders of a corporation should
have to certify that they and the corporation have a unity in identity and
interests, and therefore the corporation should be viewed as the
shareholders’ alter ego.”269 The Berkeley professors recognized that such
a certification would likely be considered a factor in any veil piercing
action later brought against the shareholder claiming the exemption.270
While scholars have discussed the lack of separation implicit in the
Hobby Lobby opinion and the connection between the requirement of
legal separation and veil piercing, what is missing from the literature is an
analysis of how states may adapt their existing corporate doctrine in light
of the Hobby Lobby decision.271 This Part provides a framework for state
courts to utilize to better define the nature of their corporate law relating
to separation and corporate purpose. It concludes that there is a strong
legal argument available to states that a past claim for an exemption based
on the unity of interest with a shareholder’s corporation should be a factor
in the veil piercing analysis. In light of the Court’s broad language
regarding corporate law, states are not assured of success but, at the very

267. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 598–99 (arguing that while the U.S. Supreme Court decides if
“the corporation is, as a general matter, a kind of entity capable of [a] right,” states are generally
responsible for determining whether a corporation “has been constituted with the power to do
whatever it is the right immunizes”).
268. Letter from Robert P. Bartlett III et al., Professors of Law, Univ. of Cal., Berkley Sch. of Law,
to Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Oct. 8, 2014) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Berkley Letter].
269. Id. at 2.
270. Id. at 7 n.25. Rather than taking a narrow view of corporate eligibility, the Trump
administration has finalized rules that open the door for any corporation to claim an exemption if they
object to any contraception coverage on religious or moral grounds. See Religious Exemptions and
Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83
Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R.
pt. 147) (allowing any corporate entity to claim an exemption from the contraceptive mandate on
religious grounds); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,592 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (allowing small businesses to claim religious or
moral exemptions to the contraceptive mandate).
271. The Court will need to utilize the same lack of separation rationale in Masterpiece Cakeshop
to find standing to reach the claims of the corporation involved, making this strategy relevant for
potential future First Amendment claims as well. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Corporate Law
Professors in Support of Respondents, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n,
584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 5127303 at *2–3.
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least, asserting it will force the Supreme Court to be upfront about how
far it intends to go in preempting state corporate law.
1.

The Legal Argument for Veil Piercing

As discussed, the test for veil piercing is not uniform across all
jurisdictions but, in general, it requires finding a unity of interest that
demonstrates the corporation is the alter ego of the shareholder and that
equity counsels in favor of ignoring the corporate form. 272 In order to
claim a religious exemption, shareholders must demonstrate that they
have disregarded the corporate form in order to utilize the corporation for
their own personal ends.273 These prerequisites for claiming an exemption
are related to the veil piercing inquiry both with respect to the lack of
separation and corporate purpose.
Legal separation is the hallmark of the corporate form.274 It is not
surprising, therefore, that the veil piercing doctrine focuses on the
separateness of the corporation.275 The lack of separation appears in
courts’ reasoning as an independent question and also within several of
the commonly used factors to justify veil piercing, including commingling
and control or domination by the shareholder.276 At its core, the veil
piercing doctrine reflects that limited liability is premised on the legal
distinction between shareholder and corporation.277

272. See supra notes 255–256 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 194–198 and accompanying text.
274. See Rutledge, supra note 198, at 18 (“There exists a real distinction between the corporation
and its shareholders. The shareholders do not ‘do business as’ the corporation, but rather, the
corporation does business as distinct legal being.”); supra note 194.
275. See FLETCHER CYC., supra note 125, § 41.10 (“The alter ego theory applies when there is
such unity between a corporation and an individual that the separateness of the corporation has
ceased.”); Presser, supra note 239, at 412–13 (noting that some jurisdictions “have hinted” that
veil piercing does not require anything more than showing the shareholder and corporation are the
alter ego of each other).
276. See, e.g., Medlock v. Medlock, 642 N.W.2d 113, 124 (Neb. 2002) (noting that a factor relevant
to piercing is “the fact that the corporation is a mere facade for the personal dealings of the shareholder
and that the operations of the corporation are carried on by the shareholder in disregard of the
corporate entity”); Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1031–32 (Wyo. 2000) (finding corporation was
a “sham” based on commingling of assets); Presser, supra note 239, at 412 (noting that the alter ego
test frequently comes down to domination or control by shareholders).
277. See Rutledge, supra note 198, at 35–36 (“The corporation is not an agent acting on behalf of
the shareholders; were that the case, then the shareholders would be personally responsible for all the
debts and obligations incurred by the corporation on behalf of its principals, and the corporation would
not be liable thereon.”).
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The Hobby Lobby decision is based on the lack of separation between
shareholders claiming the exemption and the corporation.278 Scholars
have noted that in order to claim a RFRA exemption under the opinion,
shareholders must demonstrate a unity of interest with the corporation
such that it is appropriate to ignore traditional legal separation.279 The
petitions in both Hobby Lobby and Masterpiece Cakeshop made such
claims in their filings with the Court.280 In determining whether veil
piercing is appropriate, future state courts should be permitted to consider
the parties’ previous admissions that they meet the unity of interest criteria
when claiming an exemption.
The connection between corporate purpose and veil piercing is perhaps
less obvious than the related concept of separation, but is no less important
for state courts to consider. In the Hobby Lobby opinion, the Court
emphasized that every state authorizes corporations to be formed “for any
lawful purpose or business.”281 The Court reasoned from that language
that corporations may be utilized to exercise their shareholders’ personal
religious beliefs.282 But that phrase was never intended to allow
shareholders to further purely personal ends through the corporate form.283
The “any lawful purpose” language was adopted by states to further the
profit-making ability of the corporation by giving “greater flexibility to
278. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (holding
that the corporate right to free exercise is protected to “protect[] the religious liberty of the humans
who own and control those companies”); cf. Hardee, supra note 44, at 23–25 (arguing that RFRA
exemptions require the shareholders ignore the corporate form); Mark, supra note 171, at 541 (noting
that the “entities exist solely as vehicles” to provide protection for the shareholders).
279. See Mark, supra note 171, at 541 (noting that Hobby Lobby sees the corporate entity merely
“as vehicles” used to further shareholders’ personal beliefs); Taub, supra note 89, at 405 (arguing that
Hobby Lobby permits RFRA exemptions based on three conditions, including having “human owners
that [are] co-extensive with the corporation”).
280. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4–6, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm’n, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2016 WL 3971309, at *4–6
(arguing that Mr. Phillips has “integrated” his faith into the business); Brief for Petitioners at 5, 17,
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2014) (No. 13-356),
2014 WL 173487, at *5, *17 (“[T]hey cannot separate their religious beliefs from their business
practices . . . . When a religious family runs a business, the family itself is impacted by what the
business does, or what it is required to do. There is no separating the Hahens’ faith from their business
or its actions.”).
281. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770–71 (quoting 1 J. COX & T. HAZEN, TREATISE OF THE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS § 4:1 (3d ed. 2010)).
282. Id. at 2771.
283. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-eyed Understanding of
the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 783–84 (2015) (noting that the language was adopted “to give corporate
managers the authority to move freely into new business lines and out of old ones without the
inhibiting effect of old style charters and their complement, the ultra vires doctrine”).
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corporate managers to expand into new business areas over time” without
the need for long lists of particular business purposes in their charter.284
This purpose is in line with the rationale for limited liability as a tool to
spur economic growth.285
Veil piercing doctrine supports the argument that limited liability was
not designed to allow individuals to place a liability shield around their
personal lives. The case law is replete with veils being pierced because
shareholders used the corporation to further their own personal ends: to
remodel their home,286 pay for vacations and cars,287 and for other
personal expenses.288 The veil is pierced in these cases not because, for
example, remodeling a home is not “a lawful purpose” for a corporation—
there are corporations that remodel homes for profit and corporations that
donate home remodels to the needy in their community.289 The veil is
pierced in these circumstances because remodeling the shareholder’s own
home furthers the shareholder’s interests, not the corporation’s interest.
Therefore, there is no justification for limited liability.
A state need not embrace profit maximization as the sole justification
for the corporation in order to utilize this reasoning.290 Even assuming that
corporations may engage in activities to help others regardless of
corporate profit, it does not support the argument that shareholders can
use the corporation to further their own personal ends.291 Courts have
recognized this distinction and pierced even when the shareholder had
284. Ackerman & Cole, supra note 193, at 957–58; see also Strine, supra note 283, 783–84.
285. See supra notes 236–241 and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Noble, 193 Wash. App. 1040, No. 71206-3-I, 2016 WL 1734259
(Ct. App. May 2, 2016) (unpublished decision) (piercing the veil of an LLC because, inter alia, the
LLC paid for the owners’ home remodel).
287. See, e.g., Medlock v. Medlock, 642 N.W.2d 113, 125 (Neb. 2002) (piercing veil of nonprofit
church during divorce proceedings because husband exerted control over the corporation, as
demonstrated by using corporate funds for personal vacations and vehicles, among other personal
expenses).
288. See, e.g., Shisgal v. Brown, 801 N.Y.S.2d 581, 584 (App. Div. 2005) (denying motion to
dismiss veil piercing claim because of allegations that the shareholders used the company for personal
expenses such as plastic surgery and personal parking tickets); NEC Elecs. Inc. v. Hurt, 256 Cal. Rptr.
441, 443 (Ct. App. 1989) (piercing because corporation paid personal expenses of shareholder); see
also Rutledge, supra note 198, at 19–20 (“The property of the corporation is that of the corporation
as a legal entity distinct from the shareholders, and those assets are not available to satisfy the personal
debts of the shareholders.”).
289. See,
e.g.,
Corporate
Partners,
HABITAT
FOR
HUMAN.,
https://www.habitat.org/about/partners/corporate [https://perma.cc/M67Q-AJ2C] (listing corporate
partners of Habitat for Humanity, a nonprofit organization that builds homes for people in need).
290. See supra Section I.B. (discussing debate around profit maximization principle).
291. See supra notes 116–119 and accompanying text (describing difference between CSR and
exemptions based on personal religious exercise).
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personal motives to give corporate funds to others, including personal
donations to the shareholder’s church.292
The Hobby Lobby decision predicates the corporations’ RFRA
exemptions on the requirement that they be motivated by the
shareholders’ personal, sincere religious beliefs.293 The majority makes no
pretense that the corporation itself can hold sincere religious beliefs and
instead rests its holding on the fact that the shareholders are advancing
their own personal beliefs.294 These beliefs are necessarily personal as a
corporation can no more hold sincere religious beliefs than it can desire a
home remodel. A shareholder using the corporate form to further either
personal end arguably creates conflict with the purpose of the corporation
underlying the veil piercing doctrine.295 While this distinction may appear
a mere technicality, it has a long pedigree in veil piercing cases.
It is true that when determining whether the corporation is an alter ego
of the shareholder courts have historically focused on the corporation
being used to further the shareholders’ financial ends, as those were the
only ends available to shareholders.296 Now that the Court has created a
new way, shareholders can further personal, non-financial ends through
the corporation; however, courts will need to address the impact of such
use. In doing so, the religious nature of the shareholders’ personal ends
should not be outcome determinative.297 Veil piercing can provide state
292. See, e.g., In re Crabtree, 554 B.R. 174, 198 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2016) (piercing corporate veil
in bankruptcy case because shareholder commingled funds, including the corporation making “a
personal contribution . . . to their church”); Macaluso v. Jenkins, 420 N.E.2d 251, 256 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981) (piercing veil because shareholder made personal donations to charity that were reimbursed by
the corporation and gave corporate funds to a friend); Shisgal, 801 N.Y.S.2d at 584 (denying motion
to dismiss on piercing claim because corporate funds were used to help “friends, relatives and
associates”).
293. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774–75 (2014)
(stating that the sincerity of the corporation’s “beliefs” are determined by the sincerity of the
shareholders’ beliefs); Taub, supra note 89, at 419–20 (arguing that the Court’s language
demonstrates that exemptions are predicated on the requirement that they be motivated by the
shareholders’ shared sincere religious beliefs).
294. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (“the sincerely held religious beliefs of the
companies’ owners”); id. at 2764–65 (describing the Hahn’s religious beliefs and how they exercise
those beliefs through Conestoga); id. at 2765–66 (describing the Greens’ beliefs and how they
exercise those beliefs through Hobby Lobby and Mardel); see also Hardee, supra note 44, at 28–29
(analyzing language regarding the personal nature of the shareholders’ beliefs throughout the
opinion).
295. See supra note 292 (listing cases holding that personal expenditures justify piercing).
296. See supra notes 286–288 and accompanying text (describing cases involving corporate
expenditures for personal expenses).
297. For example, to allow shareholders to use corporate funds to pay for a religious pilgrimage to
Mecca with impunity but then pierce when a shareholder uses corporate funds for a vacation would
lead to inequitable results for corporate creditors. In fact, courts have not treated religion as taking
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courts the opportunity to clarify the purpose of the corporation vis-à-vis
the shareholder’s personal, non-financial interests.
2.

Analyzing the Effect of Religious Exemptions on Veil Piercing

A shareholder’s previous claim to an exemption based on a unity of
interest with the corporation could play out in different ways in the factintensive veil piercing inquiry.298 The strongest case for piercing would
be one in which a corporation incurs a debt related to the religious identity
that was grounds for the prior exemption. For example, consider a
hypothetical involving a corporation, Corp., Inc., that had claimed a
RFRA exemption to the contraceptive mandate based on the sincere
religious beliefs of its two controlling shareholders. It is then discovered
that Corp., Inc. has been paying female employees less than its male
counterparts and not promoting women to leadership positions because
mid-level managers believed that doing so would contradict the
company’s religious principles.299 A class of female employees sues under
the state’s anti-discrimination statute and wins a substantial judgment
against Corp., Inc. The corporation has insufficient assets to satisfy this
judgment, so the class seeks to pierce the corporate veil and hold the
shareholders personally liable for this debt. The court analyzing this veil
piercing claim might use the shareholders’ previous exemption in several
ways.
The court could make the fact that the shareholder has previously
claimed an exemption based on a unity of interest with the corporation a
new, additional factor in the veil piercing test. This factor might be
particularly strong in this case as what passed through the veil
previously—the shareholders’ religious beliefs—is closely related to the
liability in the underlying employment litigation. In other words, if the
corporation has been deemed to have a religious identity based on the
shareholders’ personal religion, then liability based on the exercise of the

personal use outside the reach of the veil piercing doctrine. See In re Crabtree, 554 B.R. at 198
(piercing veil of corporation in bankruptcy in part because corporate funds were used to make
“personal contributions” to the shareholders’ church); Medlock v. Medlock, 642 N.W.2d 113, 128
(Neb. 2002) (piercing veil of nonprofit church because defendant controlled it as his alter ego).
298. See FLETCHER CYC., supra note 125, § 41.10 (“The propriety of piercing the corporate veil is
highly dependent upon the equities of the situation, and the inquiry tends to be highly fact-driven.”).
299. This hypothetical is in line with claims that have been made by for-profit companies seeking
to evade anti-discrimination laws because their religious beliefs counsel “that women’s place in the
home and the Bible gives husbands authority superior to that of their wives.” Sepper, supra note 2, at
1515 (describing past religious objections to laws in the context of religious discrimination lawsuits).
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corporation’s religion should likewise pass back through the veil to the
shareholder.
Alternatively, or in addition, the shareholders’ previous exemption
could factor into the court’s analysis of traditional veil piercing factors.
The fact that the shareholders wield the corporation to further their
personal beliefs could be used to demonstrate control and domination of
the entity by the shareholders.300 A previous exemption could be taken
into account using the commingling factor in two ways. First, a court
could determine that in claiming that the expenditure of corporate funds
to pay for employees’ contraceptive coverage is attributed to the
shareholders personally, they are commingling corporate and personal
assets.301 Second, even without financial expenditures by the corporation,
the court could consider the commingling of the shareholders’ personal
purpose and the corporation’s economic purpose, to find the shareholders
are using the corporation to further their own personal ends. Finally, in
weighing the injustice or unfairness of maintaining the corporate form, a
court may entertain the argument that it is generally unfair to allow
someone to pierce the veil at their own behest and for their personal
benefit and then disavow any debt of the corporation arising from it.
Similar to using exemptions as a stand-alone factor, the injustice claim is
strongest when the underlying liability is directly linked to the right the
shareholders have previously exercised via the corporation. Taken
collectively, these arguments could make a strong case for the court to use
its powers in equity to pierce the corporate veil of the hypothetical Corp.,
Inc. under these circumstances, even if no other veil piercing factors were
present.302
Not all veil piercing claims would necessarily give the same weight to
the shareholders’ previous exemptions. If the corporate debt was from a
slip and fall negligence action or a contract claim by a supplier, there

300. See Mitchell, supra note 230, at 1169–70 (noting that closely held corporations are more likely
to have their veil pierced because courts see control over the corporation as linked to responsibility
for the corporation’s acts).
301. This was the argument of Judge Rovner in dissent in one of the cases leading up to Hobby
Lobby. See Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 858 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (“To suggest,
for purposes of the RFRA, that monies used to fund the [corporation’s] health plan—including, in
particular, any monies spent paying for employee contraceptive care—ought to be treated as monies
from the [shareholders’] own pockets would be to make an argument for piercing the corporate veil.”).
302. For example, even if Corp., Inc. had observed all corporate formalities such as maintaining
corporate books and holding regular board meetings. See Oh, supra note 255, at 138 (noting that
failure to observe corporate formalities is a factor considered by courts but carries more weight for
contract claims).
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would be less to tie the exemption to the corporate debt.303 However, a
connection between the debt in question and the factors favoring piercing
is not always required.304 The shareholders’ previous claim of a unity of
interest with the corporation could merely serve as one additional fact to
use in determining whether the shareholders treated the corporation as a
separate entity or as their alter ego. In doing so, the court should be
cognizant of “balanc[ing] the benefits of limited liability against the
costs,” including the harm from using the corporate form to evade
protections for third parties.305
3.

Considering Prior Exemptions Faces Substantial Hurdles

The argument that states can consider prior exemptions made by the
corporation in the veil piercing analysis is likely to be met with opposition.
The Court in Hobby Lobby held that it is inappropriate under RFRA to
“discriminate” against individuals who decide to incorporate.306 Although
RFRA does not apply to the states, the idea that state law may not impose
consequences on corporations who claim RFRA exemptions could find
purchase in arguments that veil piercing creates a burden on the exercise
of a federal right.307
A burden argument would likely boil down to a question of defining
the appropriate baseline for determining what constitutes a “burden” on
religion.308 If the baseline of state law is defined as providing limited
liability for any corporation conducting business for any purpose, then
forcing individuals to give up their rights under RFRA “in exchange” for
limited liability could be problematic.309 But such a baseline ignores the
303. See, e.g., Fanning v. Brown, 85 P.3d 841, 847 (Okla. 2004) (holding trial court erred in
denying motion to dismiss veil piercing claim where allegations of abuse of corporate form related to
the neglect and abuse of plaintiff that formed basis of the claim); Presser, supra note 239, at 412
(noting that some jurisdictions require fraud for veil piercing for contractual creditors).
304. See Presser, supra note 239, at 412–13 (noting that jurisdictions differ on whether they require
injustice beyond use of the corporation as an alter ego and what that injustice needs to entail).
305. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 231, at 93, 109 (discussing that courts balance the economic
gain of limited liability against the social costs of excessive risk taking).
306. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
307. If in the future the Court provides a constitutional right to corporations to engage in the
expressive speech of their shareholders or grants corporations a free exercise right, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions could similarly be raised. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 653–54
(recognizing the potential challenge to states ability to abrogate corporate rights).
308. See Sepper, supra note 2, at 1471–77 (describing how religious liberty claims by corporations
replicate the baseline problems inherent in Lochner and how setting the baseline can be outcome
determinative).
309. There is language in the Hobby Lobby decision that suggests this is how the majority views
the baseline for corporations. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767 (noting with disapproval that the
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“artificiality of the market.”310 The incorporated form is not the “natural”
state of the market—it is a result of states altering the market to provide
special benefits, including limited liability, in exchange for agreeing to a
state-imposed structure and purpose.311
The more appropriate baseline is that people—even associations of
people engaged in business—are responsible for their own debts unless
they have established a legally separate entity that operates to further its
own economic ends, rather than the shareholders’ personal ends.312 This
is a more accurate description of state law.313 With the baseline set as such,
there is a strong argument that under the state’s definition of a limited
liability entity, shareholders who utilize their corporations for personal
ends are not burdened at all; they simply do not qualify for the privilege.
Until the federal courts explicitly preempt state power to define
corporate structure, power, and purpose, how much power states retain to
define corporations remains an open question. Like the power to make
corporate political expenditures, it seems clear that states do not have the
power to prevent looking through the corporate form to allow
shareholders to claim exemptions under RFRA.314 There is still a viable
argument, however, that states can determine when a shareholder has
misused the corporate form under state law and the consequences that
flow from it.315 While the outcome of that argument is uncertain, in
advancing it the states will, at minimum, force the Supreme Court to be
transparent about the extent to which it intends to preempt state power to
define corporations.

HHS’s position forces business people to face a “difficult choice” between giving up “judicial
protection of their religious liberty or forgo[ing] the benefits . . . of operating as corporations”).
310. See Sepper, supra note 2, at 1463 (arguing that the Court in the infamous Lochner case made
the mistake of assuming the baseline for evaluating burdens is the market status quo).
311. See Hardee, supra note 44 (describing the evolution of state law from unlimited liability
entities to limited liability corporations).
312. See Sepper, supra note 2, at 1484–85 (noting that incorporating under state law for corporate
benefits is engagement with the state that alters the market baseline).
313. See supra Section II.B.
314. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (holding that Congress intended to include shareholders
acting through the corporate form under the definition of “persons” for purposes of RFRA); Buccola,
supra note 5, at 599 (recognizing that “states cannot overrule the Court’s understanding of corporate
rights”).
315. See Buccola, supra note 5, at 599 (arguing that states can “disempower the corporations they
create from doing the kinds of things that implicate disfavored federal rights”).
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The Practical Advantages of Adapting Veil Piercing to Corporate
Rights

In addition to its substantive fit, utilizing the veil piercing doctrine has
many practical advantages that make it a good test case to begin to push
back on the federalization of corporate law. First, there is a strong
argument that the internal affairs doctrine does not apply to veil piercing
claims, thus preventing corporate flight and ensuring the benefits of the
change inure to the citizens of the state.316 Second, as an equitable
common law doctrine, state courts can evolve the doctrine slowly for
maximum impact with minimal disruptions to businesses in the state.317
1.

The Internal Affairs Doctrine May Be Disregarded for Veil
Piercing Claims

If a state wishes to protect its citizens from the power wielded by the
corporations that employ and serve them, changes to the law must apply
to all corporations doing business in the state. The potential for unlimited
personal liability for shareholders is a powerful motivator for corporate
shareholders.318 If the internal affairs doctrine applies, a corporation that
wishes to avoid the host state’s protective measures can simply
reincorporate in another state to take advantage of a more accommodating
corporate law.319
For veil piercing claims, some courts currently use the internal affairs
doctrine and apply the law of the state of incorporation, while others
already apply general choice-of-law principles.320 Professor Crespi makes
a compelling argument that the internal affairs doctrine should not apply
316. See infra Section III.C.1.
317. States can take a page from the Delaware Chancery Court for the best way to encourage
business leaders to act without putting economic priorities at risk. See, e.g., infra notes 331–332 and
accompanying text (describing how Delaware Chancery Court previews changes to the law through
dicta, academic papers, and participation in conferences, allowing companies to adjust their business
practices before the imposition of liability on any one company).
318. See Thompson, supra note 225, at 6 (“Limited liability is a much more important determinant
of business form than any particular governance rule in that entrepreneurs will react more to any
change in the liability risk than to a change in a governance rule.”).
319. See id. (noting that entrepreneurs will opt for liability benefits over internal governance rules).
It is possible that corporations will still choose to stay in a state where veil piercing is more likely if
they see other benefits from that choice. See Crespi, supra note 30, at 101 (hypothesizing that veil
piercing doctrine might not be the most important factor to shareholders in choosing place of
incorporation). Shareholders who wish to claim exemptions, however, might be more motivated to
avoid the law than an average shareholder as their risk for piercing would be known.
320. See Crespi, supra note 30, at 90 nn.13–14 (citing choice-of-law determinations from various
jurisdictions). Only Texas requires by statute that the internal affairs doctrine be used. Id. at 88.
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to veil piercing claims.321 The principles of equity inherent in veil piercing
suggest that general choice-of-law principles be used, giving “courts the
latitude to consider the interests of each jurisdiction involved in protecting
the legitimate rights and interests of its citizens.”322 Tort claimants are
involuntary creditors external to the corporate governance structure and
“simple fairness concerns” mandate the use of law appropriate to the tort
claim rather than defaulting to the law of the state of incorporation.323 For
contract claims, if the choice-of-law is specified for piercing claims, that
choice should govern.324 However, if the contract does not state which law
should be used for piercing claims, Professor Crespi argues that standard
choice-of-law analysis should apply because a contract’s general choiceof-law provision is insufficient to infer that the parties negotiated a
preference for veil piercing controversies.325
Balancing the interests of all jurisdictions involved is the better method
for both tort and contract creditors because it “removes the ability of
corporations and their shareholders to limit the shareholders’ exposure to
piercing claims merely by selectively incorporating” in jurisdictions they
consider favorable.326 This prevents shareholders and corporations from
“externalizing the consequences of their inequitable conduct.”327
Rejecting the internal affairs doctrine for veil piercing is less
problematic than doing so for matters of pure internal governance, like
shareholder voting. Adding prior exemptions as a factor to the veil
piercing test does not create “inconsistent internal governance demands”
because the decision to claim an exemption is not a matter of internal
governance procedure but rather a substantive business decision, and not
one any corporation is required to make.328
2.

As an Equitable Common Law Doctrine, Veil Piercing Provides
Flexibility and Allows for Incremental Change

There are also practical benefits deriving from states limiting corporate
power through an equitable common law doctrine like veil piercing.

321. Id. at 125–26. Professor Crespi also argues that the same analysis counsels using general choiceof-law analysis for piercing claims regarding other business entities, i.e., LLCs or LLPs. Id. at 127.
322. Id. at 108.
323. Id. at 98.
324. See id. at 105.
325. See id. at 107.
326. Id. at 125; see also id. at 98.
327. Id. at 125.
328. See id. at 103.
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Common law allows for incremental changes to the law focused on cases
that provide the most compelling argument for legal innovation.329 Given
the potential pushback from federal courts to states attempting to limit the
use of corporate exemptions, incremental change may be wise. It will
allow state courts to consider exemptions in the cases presenting the
strongest argument for finding a lack of separation or improper corporate
purpose, thereby clarifying the state’s law regarding both. Once a state
has clearly defined the requirements of separation and corporate purpose
in order to receive limited liability under its law, it will force the federal
courts to either accept the state’s power to do so or explicitly preempt it.
Common law adjudication has the potential to disrupt corporations
doing business in the state by retroactively holding an unsuspecting
shareholder personally liable for massive corporate debts.330 If used
carefully, however, the common law can allow evolution of the veil
piercing doctrine without major business disruption. For guidance on how
to do so, state courts should look to the nation’s premier corporate court—
the Delaware Court of Chancery. The Delaware Court of Chancery
frequently uses “careful and considered” dicta to regulate corporate
conduct “without requiring the litigants before it to bear the cost (through
retrospective application).”331 By announcing potential changes to
corporate governance rules through well-reasoned dicta in legal opinions,
participation in legal conferences, and publishing academic pieces, the
members of the Delaware Court of Chancery engage in an ongoing
dialogue with the business and legal community.332 In this way, changes
to the law can be phased in and the theoretical kinks worked out over the
course of several opinions.333 In a similar vein, careful consideration and
discussion of how claiming corporate exemptions may affect the limited
liability of shareholders by state courts through these channels can both
put shareholders on notice of potential personal liability and allow for the
development of the doctrine prior to a legal challenge.

329. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the Common
Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1241, 1255 (2015) (arguing that “the common law’s conceptual
architecture . . . is intrinsically designed to accommodate the process of incremental normative
change over time”).
330. See William Savitt, The Genius of the Modern Chancery System, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
570, 591 (2012) (“It may be that the retroactive application of new rules is a necessary if unfortunate
byproduct of the traditional common law system . . . .”).
331. Id. at 590 (arguing that dicta allows innovation in the law while still minimizing uncertainty).
332. See id. at 591–92 (describing process and various corporate governance rules that have
evolved through it).
333. See id. at 592–93 (describing “a long-running debate” over a potential change in review
standards carried out through court dicta and legal commentary by academics and practitioners).

10 - Hardee.docx (Do Not Delete)

274

3/25/2019 8:36 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:217

CONCLUSION
The laws governing corporations are in flux. The U.S. Supreme Court
has greatly expanded corporate rights and, consequently, expanded the
power of corporations to both influence the democratic process and claim
exemptions from democratically enacted laws designed to protect third
parties. This has upset the balance of power inherent in state corporate
law, which has long placed the regulation of harm in the realm of external
regulation rather than corporate governance. In light of recent cases, states
have no choice but to respond to the Supreme Court’s instructions to flesh
out these new corporate rights within existing corporate governance
structures.
But states do have decisions to make about how their law should adapt.
They can either incorporate new rights into their existing framework
without concern for the side effects or they can rethink the balance of
power and pursue a path that restrains corporate might when third parties
are harmed. This Article advocates the latter. Starting with a relatively
minor change to veil piercing doctrine to discourage corporations from
utilizing exemptions to the law, this Article shows how states can help
protect the interests of its human citizens. Such a change will also put
states in the best position to test how far the Supreme Court is willing to
go in federalizing corporate law. The veil piercing doctrine is not a
panacea, but it is a good first step in reasserting the right of states to define
their corporate creations.

